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This quantitative study examined principals' and
teachers' perceptions of the effects of the Pay-for-
Performance (PfP) Program on four dependent variables:
teacher motivation, parental involvement, quality of
instruction, and student achievement. School location and
school size were considered as moderating variables. The
study involved 138 teachers and 23 principals from 16 large
(> 600) and small (< 600) schools across the state of
Georgia.
Data were collected through a questionnaire and the
Georgia Department of Education database. These were
analyzed through i tests, analysis of variance, and Pearson
r correlation.
1
The findings of the study were as follows. The
teachers' perceptions of parental involvement, teacher
motivation, and quality of instruction during PfP were
significantly different from before PfP. The teachers'
perceptions of teacher motivation were higher than the
principals' perceptions. The third grade reading and math,
fifth grade math, and eighth grade math had a positive mean
gain during PfP. However, the eighth grade math maintained
its mean national percentile (NPR) score from one year to
the next, and the fifth grade reading decreased by 0.7
national percentile points. The PfP had a positive
relationship on all dependent variables and was not affected
by the schools' location (metro and nonmetro).
On school size, the principals and teachers in small
schools perceived parental involvement to be significantly
higher than respondents from larger schools. Also, the
educators in small schools believed the quality of
instruction and teacher motivation to be greater than did
the educators from small schools.
Georgia principals and teachers generally perceive
that the Pay-for-Performance Progarm is a positive school
initiative that affects the education of students,
particularly in the areas of parent involvement, student
achievement, and quality of instruction.
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During the 1900s there were numerous efforts
invested in the field of education to help students achieve
academic excellence and become productive citizens. Many
educational reforms were remedies for ineffective school
programs and/or strategies. According to Finn (1990), some
remedies included early childhood programs such as Head
Start, Pre-Kindergarten, and Title I. Other reform strate¬
gies focused on factors such as: (1) a lower teacher-pupil
ratio; (2) supplementary instructional programs, such as
school-based tutorial classes; (3) homework assistance
hotlines; (4) better prepared teachers and administrators;
(5) higher pay for educators; (6) compulsory homework
programs; and (7) incentive pay programs. Those reform
efforts were designed to improve the quality of student
learning in our schools.
However, many societal issues contribute to poor
student academic performance in today's schools, such as:
(1) a change in family structure, (2) a high family mobility
rate, (3) drugs and violence in both the living and school
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environments, (4) teenage pregnancy, (5) poverty, (6)
economic conditions, and (7) family hardships. The restruc¬
turing and reform efforts are tentative solutions to the
many ills in the educational arena and target low student
achievement.
Merit pay, the focus of this study and one of the
many programs used in educational reform, was extremely
popular in the late 1970s and the 1980s. In the 1990s, there
is a resurgence of interest in the issue of incentive pay
and higher academic achievement as evidenced by the multi¬
tude of articles appearing in newspapers, magazines, and
journals; by media publicity on television; and from public
platforms expressed by concerned citizens, school board
members, educators, governors, state and federal legisla¬
tors, and even the President of the United States. Society
is demanding that schools do a better job of educating
youth. According to Roy Romer, 1990-1991 Chair of the
National Educational Goals Panel and Governor of Colorado,
"It is imperative that we make education the most important
business in the nation, in our state, and in our individual
lives. The shape and course of our future will be determined
by our collective response" (National Education Goals Panel
1991, 1).
The results from schools in the past are no longer
sufficient for individuals in the twenty-first century.
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Renewed national interest in quality education is prompting
state and local school districts to investigate possible
solutions that will bring lasting improvements in American
education. American educators and governmental leaders are
involved in the search for new ways to improve the quality
of education in the schools of the United States. An
increased interest in incentive pay is stimulated by public
concern over the quality of education rendered in our
schools, the demand for higher salaries by teachers, the
need for higher quality students to pursue careers in
education, and professional employee shortages in the field
of education. Incentive pay for educators echoes the senti¬
ments of former Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander, who
claimed that "virtually every other important part of the
American workplace has found some fair way to pay more money
for doing a good job and, consequently, there's absolutely
no reason we can't do it in public school teaching" (quoted
in Loozen 1983, 5).
Incentive pay programs for teachers, which include
monetary incentives, master teacher plans, career-ladders,
and performance-based pay, have sparked public support.
Americans perceive incentive pay programs as a means to
improve the quality of education in the nation's schools, as
evidenced by statements in President Clinton's recent State
of the Union address in January 1998 (U.S. Department of
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Education 1998). Georgia Governor Zell Miller initiated an
incentive pay program, Pay-for-Performance (PfP), for
Georgia's educators (Georgia Department of Education 1996).
In addition, under Governor Miller's leadership, the legis¬
lators also passed legislation that guarantees educators an
annual raise of 6 percent through Governor Miller's term in
office, which ended in January 1999.
Georgia's educational mission is to increase student
achievement and maximize parental and community involvement
in all schools in the state. The Pay-for-Performance Program
specifies factors considered important for its success
(Georgia Department of Education 1997). Key stakeholders pay
meticulous attention to measuring a school's performance
results, to rewarding the individual school's performance
results, and to rewarding the individual schools that meet
the proposed objectives.
As educators and school improvement plans move in a
positive and constructive direction, more facts and infor¬
mation about the issues of incentive pay are needed. In
addition to educational leaders comparing and investigating
contemporary incentive pay plans, it is an equally important
issue to determine the opinions and attitudes of select
groups who are directly involved with implementing such a
program. The success or failure of any venture can often be
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attributed to the attitudes of those responsible for insti¬
tuting the program. Considering the viable role that atti¬
tudes can play in any situation, it is apparent that the
attitudes of personnel directly involved with incentive pay
warrant an investigation relative to this issue.
Purpose of the Study
There is a desperate need for schools and school
systems to implement some type of educational reform that
will help students become more successful in school.
Although incentive pay programs have been a primary focus
since the 1970s, for Georgia, the Pay-for-Performance
Program is a popular program for the 1990s, geared toward
school-wide performance objectives attached to monetary
rewards.
The purpose of this investigation is: (1) to examine
the perceptions of principals and teachers regarding the
Pay-for-Performance Program as it relates to selected
variables, such as parental involvement, teacher motivation,
student achievement, and the quality of instruction; and
(2) to determine if there are differences or relationships
in the perceptions of principals and teachers relative to
the Pay-for-Performance Program.
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Background of the Problem
Much of the current interest in incentive pay can be
attributed to a major report, A Nation at Risk: The Impera¬
tive for Educational Reform, published in 1983 by the
bipartisan National Commission on Excellence in Education.
In this document, there was a call for teachers' pay to be
market sensitive and performance based, with better teachers
enjoying higher rank and higher pay. That idea joined with
the views of the Puritan work ethic: "Workers should be paid
on the basis of their skills and performance" (Educational
Research Service 1983, 1). Since A Nation at Risk was
published, several dozen major reform reports have been
published that support the reality that the American educa¬
tion system fails to provide a large percentage of students
with the education that is needed to succeed in today's
society (Cross 1987).
Another report, issued by the Education Commission
of the States (ECS), also sparked interest in incentive pay.
Members of the ECS Task Force on Education for Economic
Growth (1983, 5) recommended "that the states—with full
participation by teachers themselves—drastically overhaul
and improve their methods for recruiting, training, and
compensating teachers." Those improvements, the task force
agreed, should include: extraordinary rewards for extra¬
ordinary teachers, expanded pay potential for teachers as
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they reach the upper levels of seniority and effectiveness,
and special financial incentives for teachers keyed to
differing responsibilities and filling critical needs in
certain subject areas.
In the 1980s, President Reagan supported the merit
pay concept with pronouncements in support of merit and
master teacher programs. Speaking to a gathering of state
teachers of the year, the President said, "If we want to
achieve excellence, we must reward it . . . . It's a simple
American philosophy that dominates many other professions,
so why not this one?" (quoted in Loozen 1983, 5).
Public support for improvements in our American
educational system was witnessed at the National Governors'
Convention in 1989, when the governors established six
national goals, which later became the basis for eight
National Goals to be achieved by the year 2000. Several
other groups supported incentive pay programs for teachers.
The National Commission on Excellence in Education, the
National Science Board, the National Association of Secon¬
dary School Principals, the American Association of School
Administrators, and the National Association of Elementary
School Principals have recommended that merit systems and
incentive rewards be used in pubic education. The public, in
general, endorsed basing teachers' salary on merit. However,
not all teachers seemed to favor performance-based rewards.
and the National Education Association also consistently
opposed the idea over the years (Farnsworth, Debenham, and
Smith 1991).
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A Carnegie report (Carnegie Forum on Education and
the Economy 1986) stated that America is in a trap of its
own making. A serious functional literacy problem exists
that must be corrected. Not all children master the basic
skills, yet they are continually passed along from one grade
level to the next. During the last few years, while many
schools have shown some gains in standardized test scores,
too many students are deficient in the ability to reason and
perform complex, nonroutine, intellectual tasks (Carnegie
Forum 1986). On a personal level, students, parents, and
teachers perceived that a basic promise was not being kept.
More young Americans left high school ill-prepared for
college or the job market. While the knowledge base was
rapidly expanding, the number of traditional jobs was
shrinking. Newly developed jobs require greater preparation
(National Commission on Excellence in Education 1984).
Copperman stated:
Each generation of Americans has outstripped its
parents in education, in literacy, and in economic
attainment. For the first time in the history of our
country, the educational skills of one generation
will not surpass, will not equal, will not even
approach those of their parents (quoted in National
Commission on Excellence in Education 1984, 13).
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The changing status of the world economy makes it
necessary not only to reverse the decline in school
performance, but also to reach higher standards than ever
before (Carnegie Forum 1986). Excellence in education
depends primarily upon recruiting and retaining the best
classroom teachers at a time when American schools face
serious problems recruiting and retaining high-caliber
graduates. While the teaching profession has historically
attracted college graduates who scored below average, both
the quality and number of those entering the education
profession are declining (Ballou and Podgursky 1997,
Carnegie Forum 1986, National Commission on Excellence in
Education 1984).
Teachers receive relatively low salaries and low
prestige. Many educators fail to have access to a staged
career with an opportunity for advancement. High School; A
Report on Secondary Education in jimerica (Boyer 1985)
reported that teachers were deeply troubled about salaries,
loss of status, and the lack of recognition and rewards in
their profession. Educators' salaries are not generally
commensurate with the training, skills, and responsibilities
of the profession. The drive for excellence in education
must begin by confronting these conditions. The educational
environment must include high expectations for and from
students, teachers, and administrators with commensurate
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rewards for meeting these expectations (Ballou and Podgursky
1991, Carnegie Forum 1986, Cross 1987).
Public school reform seems to center jointly on
teacher quality (how to attract and train better teachers),
and on the quality of the school workplace, (how to make the
environment more conducive to good teaching) (Cross 1987).
As standards, responsibilities, and expectations increase,
compensation must also increase. Teachers who assume extra
responsibilities and are judged to be effective by generally
accepted criteria must be rewarded accordingly (Ballou and
Podgursky 1997, Carnegie Forum 1986). However, improved
compensation for educators requires additional funding for
education. The Carnegie Forum report (1986) stated that many
polls indicated that Americans would be willing to finance
significant increases in school funding if they could be
convinced that significant improvements in performance would
follow.
While merit or performance-based pay and incentive
pay have become popular, there are some controversial issues
in the national debate over the improvement of education
(Cross 1987). The basic concept underlying most merit pay
proposals is that teachers can be motivated to perform more
effectively if some form of monetary incentive is available
for outstanding performance (Duttweiler 1988). In its pure
form, merit pay is a compensation system in which workers'
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pay is based upon their performance. Workers who exhibit
poor performance earn less, while workers who exhibit good
performance earn more. In education, incentive pay can come
in many forms, with merit being the determinant of only part
of a teacher's income.
Pav-for-Performance Program
Concerned about excellence in education, the state
of Georgia has focused upon improving the quality of educa¬
tion, teachers' salaries, and teacher productivity by
looking at the established criteria. In response to these
concerns, on May 7, 1992, Georgia Governor Zell Miller
signed into law Code 1981.20.2.213.1, enacted by Georgia Law
1992, p. 3164, 1, also known as the "Pay-for-Performance for
rewarding group activity" (Georgia School Laws 1992) . The
main goal of that law was to enhance the overall educational
performance of schools in areas related to student outcomes
and achievement as adopted under the National Goals 2000
(Georgia School Laws 1992).
The Pay-for-Performance (PfP) is a school
improvement program designed to promote exemplary
performance and collaboration at the school level
with monetary rewards for groups (incentive pay).
Comprehensive and systematic improvement efforts are
encouraged in order to improve learning for all
students. The program is open to all K-12 public
schools in Georgia (Georgia Department of Education
1997, 1).
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According to the Code of Georgia (Georgia School
Laws 1992), proposals shall be submitted by local schools or
systems for the determination of exemplary performance at
the school site. "Performance objectives must be developed
in four broad categories: academic achievement, client
involvement, educational programming, and resource develop¬
ment" (Georgia Department of Education 1997, 1). If these
objectives are achieved within a school, the school receives
a monetary allotment equivalent to $2,000 per full-time
certified teacher. As a collective group, the staff members
in a school decide how the money is to be spent. Schools
that have won incentives have spent the funds in various
ways, including: (1) dividing the funds among the staff
members,. (2) spending it on the school, C3) awarding indi¬
vidual bonuses, and (4) spending it on school programs and
projects (Georgia Department of Education 1997).
The chief administrator at any particular school
site in the state of Georgia is the principal. The principal
is responsible for monitoring and assessing both staff and
student performance. Administrators along with the school
staff write, implement, and carry out the goals stated in
the proposal. They also are responsible for the submission
of the school's annual proposal to the Georgia Department of
Education. This places the school-level administrators in a
position of being able to provide informed insight into the
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effectiveness of Georgia's Pay-for-Performance Program and
its effects on parental involvement, as well as student and
staff performance in their schools.
According to the State Superintendent of Schools,
Linda Schrenko (Georgia Department of Education 1996, 1):
Our staff has done an excellent job of training
sessions in the last year and had over six hundred
participants in each session. Although all applicant
schools did not receive the award, making a very
public statement about their desire to attain
excellence.
"Pay-for-Performance is an excellent name, because the
program inspires local schools to set higher goals and then
to work hard over the next year to attain those goals,"
Schrenko added (Georgia Department of Education 1996, 1) .
Table 1 shows statistics for the Pay-for-Performance
(PfP) Program by school year (Georgia Department of Educa¬
tion 1996, 1-2).
Statement of the Problem
Since implementing the Pay-for-Performance Program,
the state of Georgia has spent $13,060,000 to fund local
schools who have applied and successfully met the perfor¬
mance objectives. During the first few years of Georgia's
PfP Program, less than 1 percent of its total schools won
the incentive. During the 1996-97 school year, 3 percent of
Georgia's middle and elementary schools won the incentive
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TABLE 1
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PROGRAM BY SCHOOL YEAR
School
Year # Submitted # Approved # Awards
$ Amount
per Year
1993-94 67 18 10 $1,048,000
1994-95 100 45 19 $1,782,000
1995-96 100 37 29 $3,096,000
1996-97 228 91 59 $6,694,000
Notes:
1. # Submitted = Number of initial applications submitted
March 1.
2. # Approved = Number approved out of the total number of
March 1 applications.
3. # Awards = Number of approved applications that received
a PfP award.
4. $ Amount = Total amount of PfP dollars awarded per year
(Georgia Department of Education 1996, 1-2).
pay. According to Weber (1988), at the onset of the 1980s,
only about 4 percent of the schools in the United States had
an operational merit plan.
The majority of schools in Georgia have not parti¬
cipated in this program. Factors such as school size and
school location contribute to a school's decision to par¬
ticipate or not to participate in the incentive program.
This researcher ponders if the expenditure of $12,620,000
produced the results that were expected by the state, as
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perceived by Georgia's school level principals and teachers.
This kind of expenditure causes one to reflect on the
investments and the improvements that were made on parental
involvement, teacher motivation, student achievement, and
the quality of instruction, all of which are performance
objectives of the Pay-for-Performance Program.
Too many students are not performing academically in
our public schools, especially those from lower socioeco¬
nomic backgrounds and minorities. The present bureaucracy
and traditional methods are not working. Educational stake¬
holders and others must find a way to help all students
become successful in school so that they become contributing
citizens in life. The vast amount of research from the
corporate and public school sectors indicates that incentive
pay programs are instriamental in attaining organizational
objectives. The Pay-for-Performance Program may be that
avenue to foster student achievement and exemplary teacher
performance. The implementation of innovative and new pro¬
grams, through educational reforms, is to motivate teachers
and better prepare students for the twenty-first century.
Society's future depends on the positive experiences that
children encounter in school today.
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Significance of the Study
This study will add to the body of knowledge about
the effects of the Pay-for-Performance Program on Georgia
school efforts and give some indication of the possible
effects of supplemental and performance-based pay plans on
school performance.
Presently, very few schools have applied, have been
approved, or have won the state's incentive pay. Findings
from this study will provide schools data that will indicate
the worthiness of participating in the Pay-for-Performance
Program. In addition, the results of this study will add
more information to the body of knowledge on Pay-for-
Performance incentive programs as school-wide improvement
plans. This study will show, as measured by the perceptions
of Georgia principals and teachers, if increased monetary
rewards provided by Pay-for-Performance have resulted in
improved teacher and student performance.
Research Questions
The following research questions were developed to
guide this study:
1. Is there a relationship between parental
involvement before PfP and parental involvement during PfP
as perceived by principals?
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2. Is there a relationship between parental
involvement before PfP parental involvement during PfP as
perceived by teachers?
3. Is there a relationship between teacher
motivation before PfP and teacher motivation during PfP as
perceived by principals?
4. Is there a relationship between teacher
motivation before PfP and teacher motivation during PfP as
perceived by teachers?
5. Is there a relationship between quality of
instruction before PfP and quality of instruction during PfP
as perceived by principals?
6. Is there a relationship between quality of
instruction before PfP and quality of instruction during PfP
as perceived by teachers?
7. Is there a difference between parental involve¬
ment before PfP and parental involvement during PfP as
perceived by principals?
8. Is there a difference between parental involve¬
ment before PfP and parental involvement during PfP as
perceived by teachers?
9. Is there a difference between teacher motivation
before PfP and teacher motivation during PfP as perceived by
principals?
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10. Is there a difference between teacher motivation
before PfP and teacher motivation during PfP as perceived by
teachers?
11. Is there a difference between student reading
achievement before PfP and student reading achievement
during PfP in terms of (a) Grade 3, (b) Grade 5, and (c)
Grade 8?
12. Is there a difference between student math
achievement before PfP and student math achievement during
PfP in terms of (a) Grade 3, (b) Grade 5, and (c) Grade 8?
13. Is there a difference between quality of
instruction before PfP and quality of instruction during PfP
as perceived by principals?
14. Is there a difference between quality of
instruction before PfP and quality of instruction during PfP
as perceived by teachers?
15. Is there a difference between the principals'
and the teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance and
parental involvement in terms of school size?
16. Is there a difference between the principals'
and the teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance and
parental involvement in terms of school location?
17. Is there a difference between the principals'
and the teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance and
teacher motivation in terms of school size?
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18. Is there a difference between the principals'
and the teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance and
teacher motivation in terms of school location?
19. Is there a difference between the principals'
and the teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance and
quality of instruction in terms of school size?
20. Is there a difference between the principals'
and the teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance and
quality of instruction in terms of school location?
Summary
In countless Georgia schools, standardized test
scores in reading comprehension and mathematics are below
the 50th percentile for many students. Students are leaving
school inadequately prepared to meet the challenges of the
workforce or college. Therefore, large numbers of students
begin college careers taking developmental courses, and it
is often necessary for businesses to reeducate workers on
skills that should have been mastered in high school. In an
effort to alleviate these problems, school systems through¬
out the country, along with our national leaders, have
focused on offering incentive pay to attract and retain the
most qualified and talented instructional staffs. However,
is this a solution to the problem? Will more pay motivate an
individual to produce better results? Such a reform requires
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that all aspects of the school organization, including the
perceptions of personnel, be restructured.
Chapter II presents a review of the related litera¬
ture. The literature focuses on studies and information
relative to the Pay-for-Performance concept and the selected
variables in this study.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE
In this chapter, a review of selected literature
pertinent to the study is presented. The school reform
movement, incentive pay as a reform strategy, and the
advantages and disadvantages of incentive pay are discussed.
The Georgia Pay-for-Performance Program is reviewed, as well
as its impact on parental involvement, teacher motivation,
student achievement, and the quality of instruction.
The School Reform Movement
The common theme raised by all of the reform reports
is the need for the development, adoption, and implementa¬
tion of incentive and merit pay systems that adequately
reward teachers for their work, based upon the quality of
their work (Alexander 1986, Carnegie Forum 1986, EETF 1984,
Nathan 1986, NCEE 1984). Every state has enacted or is
considering implementing educational reforms, from upgrading
curricula to raising teachers' salaries and rewarding good
teaching. However, state governments should consider four
areas for improving the quality of teaching in American
21
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schools. First, teacher education and certification
requirements should be upgraded. Second, those school
districts that develop and implement incentive programs
should be provided with financial assistance. Third, state¬
wide incentive programs should be established. Fourth, the
state should provide technical assistance for planning and
implementing incentives to improve the quality of teaching
(Cresap et al. 1984).
Three major responsibilities fall within the
province of the federal government when the problems that
face school excellence are addressed. First, financial
assistance should be provided to help qualified students
enter teaching, especially in areas of national shortage.
Second, local school districts should receive federal grants
to demonstrate the effective use of a range of incentives to
improve the quality of teaching. Third, federal funding
should support research about the impact and effectiveness
of varied incentives in school districts and states (Cresap
et al. 1984).
Georgia's Governor, Zell Miller, focused on results
in education and wanted to make a lasting impact on educa¬
tion in his state. He was not satisfied with the status quo.
This governor expended funds for the Pre-Kindergarten Pro¬
gram for four-year-olds and the HOPE Scholarship Program for
high school graduates with a 3.0 GPA. Miller attempted to
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raise teachers' salaries to the national average and pro¬
vided funding for teachers in areas with critical shortages
in an attempt to improve the educational attainment in the
state of Georgia. Governor Miller believed that highly
educated citizens are vital to economic development because
states that have invested in education have attracted new
industry within their borders (Nathan 1986).
Governors are willing to work for increased funding
for education, as long as they can show the public that the
funds will have a positive impact on student achievement
(Nathan 1986). Alexander (1986, 202-203) stated:
The governors are ready for some old-fashioned
horse trading. We'll regulate less, if schools and
school districts will produce better results. Real
excellence cannot be imposed from the distance.
Governors don't create excellent schools—local
school leaders, teachers, parents, and citizens—do.
Former National Education Association (NEA)
President Mary Hatwood Futrell warned governors that the
recommendations of the "Time of Results" will be costly and
will work only if sanctioned at the local levels by teachers
and principals. Albert Shanker, president of the American
Federation of Teachers (AFT), agreed with Futrell that the
governors should find funds to enact their recommendations.
He also urged educators not to wait for everything to be
prefect before beginning to make changes in the way they do
things (Nathan 1986).
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State legislatures and departments of education have
responded with a myriad of educational improvement programs
that fall into two general categories, according to Odden
and Allan (1995). The first type of program is school-based
and primarily involves local school people in planning,
problem solving, and program implementation. The second type
is instructionally focused and is designed to improve the
skills of teachers and administrators.
There are a number of state programs in the category
of instructionally focused. Maryland's School Improvement
Through Instructional Process Program aims at expanding
and strengthening the pedagogical skills of experienced
teachers. Beginning teachers are the focus of Georgia's
Teacher Appraisal Program, which includes assessment of new
teachers and on-the-job skill development- Hunter's master
learning provides the core of Missouri's Instructional
Management System, while Arkansas' Program for Effective
Teaching targets the improvement of both the instructional
skills of teachers and the supervisory skills of adminis¬
trators. States with instructionally focused programs view
improved teaching and better instructional supervision as
elementally crucial to educational improvement.
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Incentive Pay as a Reform Strategy
Incentive pay is a compensation scheme that arrived
in the late 1800s, about the same time that schools shifted
from the one-room schoolhouse to graded schools. Many states
adopted a grade-based salary schedule in an attempt to
address the problem of high teacher turnover (English 1992).
Meanwhile, in individual cities, teachers were paid based on
their years of experience, gender, race, and the grade level
that they taught. This is when school administrators first
factored a subjective measure of merit into the teachers'
salaries (Tyack and Strober 1981). In Boston, for example,
salary pay in 1876 was based on the grade level a teacher
taught, and where the teacher fell within that range
reflected years of experience and the administrators'
assessment of the teacher's merit (Katz 1987).
In 1921, Denver and Des Moines became the first
cities to introduce the single salary schedule for teachers
based solely on a teacher's years of experience and level of
academic preparation (Sharpes, 1987). That compensation
system was so named because all classroom teachers in the
city were paid on the same scale, regardless of gender,
race, grade level taught, or family status of the teacher
(Educational Research Services 1978) . When a 1944 National
Education Association report stated that any existing
measure of teacher merit used to determine pay under the
26
grade-based salary schedule was unreliable, cities rapidly
responded by following the lead of Denver and Des Moines. By
1950, 97 percent of all schools had adopted the single
salary schedule (Sharpes 1987) .
The single salary schedule operates as a matrix
structure of dollar amounts in columns and rows. The
columns, also called "scales" or "lanes," represent
teachers' levels of educational attainment, such as
bachelor's degree, master's degree, specialist degree, and
doctorate degree. The rows, frequently called "steps,"
represent years of teaching experience. Any individual
teacher's salary is determined by locating the cell on the
schedule that corresponds to the educational level and years
of teaching experience. Pay raises occur at predictable
intervals as the teacher advances within the matrix by
gaining experience and/or by furthering education (Clardy
1988).
The fact that the single salary schedule has
remained the primary method of paying teachers for so long
testifies to its advantages. It addresses equity and objec¬
tivity because salary increases are no longer partially
based on what teachers viewed as arbitrary administrative
assessment of their merit. Additionally, school districts
can accurately budget funds because the salary schedule
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promotes certainty and predictability of annual salary
costs.
However, the single salary schedule does have its
problems. With the single salary schedule, teachers are
encouraged to continue taking more and more graduate-level
college courses, many of which are often not directly
related to their teaching assignments, in order to move to
the right on the schedule (Clardy 1988). However, there is
little evidence that any graduate education per se improves
classroom teaching. There is evidence that experience is
related to teaching effectiveness, but the relationship is
strong only for the first few years of teaching (Ferris and
Winkler 1986). Therefore, the single salary schedule fails
to provide teachers with incentives to improve their skills
in the classroom.
Perhaps the most common criticism of the single
salary schedule is that it treats teachers with the same
educational level and experience as equals, despite unequal
performance and skills (Lipsky and Bacharach 1983). As far
back as 1867, Aaron Sheeley, the school superintendent in
Adams County, Pennsylvania, claimed that paying all teachers
the same wages "offers a premium to mediocrity, if not to
positive ignorance and incompetency. Inducements should
always be held out to teachers to duly qualify themselves
for their work" (English 1992, 5). It was that type of
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criticism that led to the popularity of the many
performance-based compensation schemes tried in the late
1980s, such as merit pay and career ladder programs.
The 1983 A Nation at Risk report recommended that
teacher salaries be "professionally competitive, market-
sensitive, and performance-based" (National Commission on
Excellence, 1983, 30). The goal of performance-based pay
systems was directly tied pay to classroom skills, while the
single salary schedule solely rewarded experience and
education. The more direct the link between pay and
performance, the greater the level of accountability
teachers had to both educational administrators, students,
parents, and the public at large. Districts and states
across the nation responded to A Nation at Risk with a
flurry of activity by establishing merit pay, career
ladders, and other incentive pay programs for teachers, most
of which were unsuccessful.
Advantages and Disadvantages
of Incentive Pav
The first recorded merit pay plan for teachers was
established in Massachusetts in 1908 (Loozen 1986). Interest
in such plans grew rapidly and reached a peak in the 1920s.
That interest diminished to the extent that merit pay plans
were practically nonexistent in the 1930s and 1940s.
29
Interest was revived in the 1950s, with some state legis¬
latures enacting state mandates for merit plans. Use of such
plans reached a high point in the 1960s and began to decline
again in the early 1970s. Following the issuance of the
United States Department of Education report, A Nation at
Risk, merit pay again surfaced as the vehicle to solve the
nation's educational ills. Therefore, the rebirth of that
concept was primarily the result of education reformers and
the Reagan administration in the early 1980s.
Merit pay plans award teachers pay bonuses for
excellent classroom performance, usually determined by
supervisor and peer review. A wide variety of merit pay
programs have been tried in districts across the nation,
meeting with great publicity and varying success. One
district plan that typifies the ups and downs associated
with merit pay is in Fairfax County Public Schools District,
Virginia. Adopted in 1987, the plan was fully implemented in
the district's 165 schools by the 1987-1990 school years.
Bonuses equal to 9 percent of salaries were awarded each
year for four years to teachers deemed "skillful" or
"exemplary" (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford 1994, 131-136). The
plan was suspended in 1992 due to budget cuts, then restored
to a scaled-down version in 1994. While there is public
support for this plan, the two major teacher organizations,
the AFT (American Federation of Teachers) and the NEA
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(National Education Association), believe that the plan is
too costly and that it undermines teacher collegiality by
creating a competitive work environment (Richardson 1992).
The Georgia Association of Educators (GAE) is also
opposed to merit pay. In 1984, delegates to the GAE Annual
Convention adopted the following policy on merit pay that
has consistently been reconfirmed by the association:
The Association continually seeks opportunities
to improve education in Georgia but believes that
merit pay is not a solution to the problems of
providing quality public education for Georgia
students. Serious discussion of the possible need
for merit pay proposals should not begin until
salaries reach the national average, teacher prep¬
aration programs are strengthened, QBE is fully
implemented, evaluation of personnel is performance
based, staff development programs are strengthened
and current certification requirements are enforced
(Georgia Association of Educators 1991, 1-2) .
These criticisms are like those of other merit pay plans
across the nation. According to a 1979 Educational Research
Service study, most merit pay plans are discontinued within
six years, largely due to problems of administration and
personnel, collective bargaining, and budgetary shortfalls
(English 1992) , a conclusion also reached by Humane and
Cohen (1986).
Positive attributes are attached to the Arizona
merit pay program, known as a state-funded, career-ladder
program. Students taught by Arizona's teachers in the
career-ladder program show increased achievement, lower
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dropout rates and increased graduation rates (Cornett 1994).
These improvements are especially great in districts where
the career-ladder program focuses on developing and improv¬
ing teachers' classroom skills (Conley and Odden 1994).
Overall, in a study of eighteen school district
programs since 1983, Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford (1994)
found that some districts reported positive effects, such as
reduced teacher turnover and absenteeism; however, most
districts were unsuccessful in creating lasting and effec¬
tive incentive plans. On the other end of the scope, some
districts cited significant teacher morale problems stemming
from competition, unfair evaluation practices, and the use
of quotas in determining the niomber of teachers to receive
awards. Programs were also costly (when funding was stable)




Pay-for-Performance (PfP) is a voluntary one-and-
one-half-year school improvement and incentive program
designed to promote exemplary student achievement, client
(parental) involvement, and faculty collaboration. In March
of each year, applicant schools submit proposals that
provide detailed descriptions of performance objectives.
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which indicate what the school will do to promote exemplary
performance. Each proposal must include a thorough descrip¬
tion of how the performance objectives will be achieved and
evaluated, A trained PfP Reader Panel reads and rereads the
proposals. The panel is designed to be representative of all
school systems in the state.
The performance objectives must address four areas:
academic achievement, client involvement, educational
programming, and resource development. These objectives
represent a contract with the Department of Education and
must be judged by the reader panel to be exemplary. The
criteria for success must be clearly described before a
school is approved for participation in the program. Lastly,
a school must achieve at least 80 percent of its performance
objectives to receive a Pay-for-Performance award. Success¬
ful schools receive $2,000 per full-time, certified staff
member (Georgia Department of Education 1996). The end
result and, hopefully, lasting result is school-wide
improvement.
Teachers' Perceptions on Incentive Pay
It has been found that most teachers, when given the
chance, choose to receive additional pay for more work
rather than for demonstrating high performance. In addition,
teachers who participate in incentive programs are positive
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about the programs; those who do not are negative. However,
teachers who philosophically disagree with the idea of pay
for performance will probably never see any type of incen¬
tive program working (Cornett and Gaines 1994).
Parental Involvement
The Pay-for-Performance Program attempts to promote
client (parent) involvement. Most educators recognize
parental involvement in school activities and in the
student's schoolwork as integral to successful student
academic performance. Comer and Haynes (1991) found parental
participation in a child's education to be essential for
effective teaching and learning. Comer and Haynes described
three general ways in which schools might enhance parental
involvement by having parents (1) participate in school
events and activities, (2) help in the classroom and school
programs, and (3) participate in parent groups.
Another researcher, James Griffith (1996), inves¬
tigated the relationship between parental involvement and
student academic performance. Griffith surveyed forty-two
elementary schools to examine the relation of parental
involvement and empowerment to student academic performance.
Results showed that measures of parental involvement and
empowerment could be reliably predicted. Multiple regression
analyses showed that parental involvement and empowerment
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accounted for substantial variances in the students'
standardized test performance. Positive relations of
parental involvement to student test performance were
largely unaffected by the schools' characteristics or the
socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic composition of the student
populations (Griffith 1996).
Educators and researchers have speculated on the
nature of relations between parental involvement and student
academic performance, but empirical results are equivocal
(Reynolds, Weissberg, and Kasprow 1992) . In one study,
Reynolds et al. (1992) examined variables related to early
school adjustment among inner-city Icindergarten and first-
grade students. They used two teacher-rated scales to assess
parental involvement. The first scale asked teachers to rate
the frequency of parent participation in school activities.
The second scale asked teachers to rate the perceived
quality of parent-student relationships. Teachers' percep¬
tions of the quality of parental involvement were signifi¬
cantly and positively related to competency in reading
comprehension and mathematics problem solving and to school
absences. Teachers' perceptions of actual parent participa¬
tion showed similar relations with the adjustment measures,
although those relations were lower in magnitude. Reynolds
et al. (1992) noted that the majority of variance in the
five measures of school adjustment was accounted for by
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prior adjustment and student sociodemographic character¬
istics .
In a rare longitudinal study conducted over two
consecutive years, Reynolds (1992) collected data from
parents, teachers, and students regarding perceptions of
parental involvement. He also gathered data on reading and
mathematics test performance from participants who were
primarily low-income, minority students. The measure of
parental involvement was a 21-item scale that assessed the
frequency of parent behaviors at school (e.g., participate
in school activities) and at home (e.g., read to the child).
Parental involvement and the achievement tests had low to
moderate positive correlations. Teachers' perceptions of
parental involvement had the highest correlations with
student achievement. Regardless of the source, perceptions
of parental involvement significantly predicted student
achievement in both years.
Earlier studies showed similar relations between
parental involvement and student academic performance.
Stevenson and Baker (1987) found a positive relation between
parental involvement and the student's school performance in
a sample of 179 grade school children, parents, and
teachers. They also observed that parents of high educa¬
tional attainment whose children were in lower grades
reported higher levels of involvement than did parents of
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low educational attainment. Parental involvement was
measured by having teachers rate the frequency of parents
attending school events.
The findings of the studies presented support the
contention that parental involvement is an important element
in a student's academic performance. Parental involvement
was consistently correlated with student test performance.
To increase parent attendance at school activities,
schools might coordinate with the parent-teacher associa¬
tions to provide transportation and day care services during
school events. School staff and parent volunteers might
conduct follow-ups with parents to determine reasons for
nonattendance.
Teacher Motivation
School administrators agree that motivation is
crucial in the organization. As to how to actually achieve
it and/or define it, all administrators are not in total
agreement. John Miner (1988, 158) defined motivation as
"those processes within an individual that stimulates
behavior and channels it in ways that should benefit the
organization as a whole." Gary Johns (1983, 173) stated,
"Motivation means three things: The person works hard; the
person keeps at his or her work; and the person directs his
or her behavior toward appropriate goals." For this study
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the researcher will use the definition of motivation to mean
that a person exerts self-effort toward and is persistent in
working toward the organization's goals.
Hersey and Blanchard (1977) indicated that the
motivation and behavior of individuals was really a search
for answers to perplexing questions. Freud (1927) suggested
that the motivation for the actions of individuals was not
always evident to the individuals themselves. Research by
Mayo (1924) implied that some human actions were based on
how much attention was directed toward individuals. One
common complaint noted by teachers related to "lack of
recognition." Maslow (1970) claimed that certain human
needs, as described in his five-tier hierarchy of needs,
motivated individuals. Herzberg had a theory about
motivators. He felt that basic needs, which he called
hygiene factors, did not serve as motivators but, if absent,
they served as demotivators. Certain other factors, which he
called motivators, encouraged people toward a higher quality
of performance. Alderfer developed the ERG theory, which
suggested that existence needs, relatedness needs, and
growth needs motivated individuals (Lunenburg and Ornstein,
1991).
Peter Hutchinson, superintendent of the Minneapolis
schools, recognized that the centerpiece of his school
system was a performance objective, called student
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achievement, which was measured largely by test scores.
Additionally, he believed that money had a motivating, poy/er
that could drive school administrators and teachers to be
more accountable to their communities (Bushweller 1997).
Student Achievement
For the past fourteen or so years, policy makers,
educators, and community members have been working to
improve student achievement by reforming the public
education system. However, progress has been slower than
desired, and questions persist about which reforms return
the most benefit for the money, time, and effort invested.
Mary Fulton (1996) , a policy analyst with the
Education Commission of the States, reported that student
performance was improved by: (1) laying a strong foundation
before a child enters school, (2) focusing on essential
skills in the early grades, (3) expecting all students to
take a challenging curriculum and advanced courses, (4)
building teachers' knowledge and skills, and (5) creating a
school environment conducive to successful teaching pnd
learning.
A recent article in The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
titled, "Applying '3 Rs' to Teachers" (Suggs 1998) , referred
to teachers receiving a minor in reading during undergradu¬
ate college course work to learn how to teach reading. With
39
that one reform, future teachers would be better prepared to
teach fundamental subjects, such as reading and math. At
present, many teacher preparation programs require that
prospective elementary school teachers take one or two
reading courses. A proposal requires that they take about
eighteen hours of reading and math (Suggs 1998). This
proposal is expected to be approved by the University System
of Georgia's Board of Regents and concurs with Fulton's
suggestion of building teachers' knowledge and skills in an
effort to bring about positive school reform.
Gazing over the bountiful fields of state education
reforms and school improvement plans, one is struck, how¬
ever, by the scarcity of solid evidence concerning the
improvement of student performance. The lack of evidence can
be attributed partly to the fact that many of the reform
efforts are in their infancy; there has not been enough time
to measure their success.
Fulton (1996) believed that the following practices
should be built into the policy making process to increase
the chance that education reforms will lead to improved
student performance: (1) a set of criteria that defines
success and measures progress; (2) a reliance on objectives
and solid information to develop education policies; (3) a
comprehensive, long-term plan that focuses on improving
teaching and learning; (4) regular and rigorous evaluations
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of whether initiatives are achieving their intended goals;
and (5) a commitment to "stay the course" with education
reform plans.
The surest sign of student achievement is high
standardized test results. However, an important preliminary
question is how the relationship among teacher salaries,
the quality of instruction, and student outcomes play on
each other. Student achievement, as a performance objective
of many school systems, is generally measured through
standardized test scores, although test scores can be
manipulated in many ways. The Georgia Association of
Educators commented that increases in student achievement
test scores are often preferred over administrators' ratings
of performance and classroom observations because the
measurement is perceived to be more objective. However,
their objectivity is illusory when applied to the measure¬
ment of a teacher's performance. Achievement tests may not
consider all variables. Teachers must work with students
whose individual characteristics vary considerably within a
class, as well as among several classes on the same grade
level. Also, certain key characteristics of students, such
as intelligence and home environment, greatly influence the
quality and quantity of their academic achievement, regard¬
less of what the teacher does in the classroom.
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Characteristics of achievement tests can have a
profound effect on what is actually measured, how it is
interpreted, and the extent to which student performance
reflects teacher effectiveness. Does the test measure what
is actually taught in the schools (curricular validity)?
Does it measure the content actually taught to the students
(instructional validity)? Then there is the question of
whether or not the test is reliable. Does it consistently
measure what it purports to measure? (Georgia Association of
Educators 1991)
The initiative, merit pay, is an incentive-based pay
system intended to reward good teaching above and beyond the
base salary level. These programs have received mixed
evaluations and are quite controversial. An Arizona study
found that merit pay increased student achievement, lowered
dropout rates, and improved graduation rates. Furthermore,
some teachers involved in such programs report they welcome
the chance for their skills and expertise to be formally
recognized and rewarded. Critics, however, claim there is no
agreement on what constitutes good teaching; it is difficult
to evaluate a teacher's "merit," the rewards are too small,
and the plans create unhealthy competition among teachers
and an even greater sense of isolation within schools.
To date, a number of reform efforts are at work to
increase student learning. Research-based evidence is just
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emerging on many of these efforts, and for education policy
to have a greater impact on student achievement, policy¬
makers need more rigorous, thoughtful processes for making
decisions. State leaders and educators need to put together
a diverse package of initiatives combining the best of the
"old" with the most promising of the "new." Finally, they
have to stay on course with the educational reform plans,
even if governmental leadership changes.
Georgia Student Assessments
Various standardized tests are periodically admin¬
istered in an attempt to measure the success of Georgia
students. However, as Johnson (1986, 67) stated, "if the
product of schooling is a well-educated student, individual
teachers control only a piece of the product." Furthermore,
Mary Futrell, former NEA president and Carnegie task force
member, concurred that there are no satisfactory methods for
measuring student performance and linking this performance
with teachers' compensation. According to Futrell, effective
teaching and student performance are very much related to
class size, fiscal resources, and similar factors beyond the
teachers' control (Carnegie Forum, 1986).
In accordance with Georgia legislation passed in
1991, uniform statewide student achievement data are no
longer required at every grade. However, in the DeKalb
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County School System, a norm-referenced test (NRT) package,
the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS), is administered to
all students in Grades 1-8. The Georgia Department of
Education only requires that the NRT be administered to all
of the state's third, fifth, and eighth graders. The purpose
of the NRT is to obtain information about how the perfor¬
mance of Georgia students compares with that of students in
a national sample. NRTs are standardized instruments which
measure how well students perform in relation to a particu¬
lar reference group (same age or grade) on a nationwide
basis.
Other tests required by the state include the State
Board-designated Curriculum-Based Assessments (CBAs) and the
Writing Assessments given at only Grades 3, 5, 8, and 11.
These assessments include the evaluation of higher order
thinking skills, as well as basic skills and concepts. The
CBAs are assessments designed to provide information on the
achievement of specific knowledge or skills included in
the state-required curriculum. This test compares all the
third, fifth, and eighth graders in the state. All children
enrolled in Georgia public school kindergarten programs are
required to be assessed for first-grade readiness with an
instrument or instruments adopted by the State Board of
Education.
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To comply with state statutes, the Georgia State
Board of Education adopted the 1990 Georgia Kindergarten
Assessment Program (GKAP) as the designated kindergarten
assessment for all Georgia public schools. Georgia law
requires that curriculiam-based assessments be administered
in Grade 11 for graduation purposes. This test is the
Georgia High School Graduation Test (GHSGT) and is often
referred to as the graduation test.
School Size/Class Size
According to Futrell (Carnegie Forum 1986), class
size is a variable that affects effective teaching and
student performance; therefore, it warrants a literature
investigation for this study.
The Georgia Department of Education does not regu¬
late or recommend ideal school sizes. The DeKalb County
School System does not suggest a preference for a school's
populace. Their system's Planning and Facilities Department
reports that it only looks at the niomber of students to plan
for future building needs.
On the other hand, the literature revealed that
parents do have a preference about school and class size
when given the opportunity to choose a school. However,
parents' definition of an ideal school and/or system
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differs. Preferences regarding indicators such as academic
rigor, school system expenditures, school size, and com¬
munity characteristics vary with each family. According to a
USA Today Magazine article (April 1992), a majority of
parents (63.4 percent) indicated that small or very small
class sizes for elementary school-age youngsters are
preferable. By contrast, 58 percent felt that "average"
class sizes are suitable for junior and senior high school
students. Parents tended to avoid very large or very small
school systems. Only 1.4 percent looked for the former, and
0.5 percent prefer that latter.
The general public's perception appears to be
married to the notion that students will be more successful
in schools with smaller student populations. With this
intuitive hunch unvalidated by research, educational leaders
find themselves pressured into making decisions to use
scarce financial resources to build smaller or additional
school buildings rather than focusing on programs, person¬
nel, and initiatives that make significant improvements in
teaching and learning. Research on the relationship between
size of the school population and student academic perfor¬
mance is inconclusive and fails to establish any clear
implications for educators to follow (Berkey 1996). However,
a number of researchers studying academic achievement and
issues influencing it recognized class size as a process
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factor on academic achievement over which schools do
exercise control (Caldas and Bankston 1997).
An article by Majorie Coeyman (1990), a staff writer
for the Christian Science Monitor, supported small schools.
In her article Beth Lief, president of New Visions for
Public Schools, a nonprofit organization that has helped to
organize thirty small schools in New York City, said that
even a school of 1,000 students was "ridiculous"—her idea
of a reasonable size: anything below 500. Leif stated that
today's educational theory supports hands-on learning over
traditional lecture-style classes and "project work." The
small student populations "make it so much easier to
organize this type of work" (Coeyman 1990, B4) .
According to Tom Gregory, professor of education at
Indiana University in Bloomington, "You won't find a
researcher anywhere in the country who supports big schools.
In his mind, even 400 is too large" (Coeyman 1990, B4).
Sally Kilgore, director of the Modern Red Schoolhouse
Institute in Nashville, Tennessee, a nonprofit group that
works to reproduce the virtues of the old-fashioned small
school in a modern setting, agreed with Gregory and Lief on
small school size, especially in the urban areas. Kilgore
believed that smaller schools lessen the discipline problems
because there is a feeling of attachment and belonging, and
all teachers will know all the students (Coeyman 1990).
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Phillip O'Reilly, principal of the 125-student Heath
Elementary School in Massachusetts, said, "The small schools
have their pros and cons. Small schools have fewer support
services" (Coeyman 1990, B4). In some suburbs, efforts to
break down large schools have caused parental unhappiness.
The parents said, "The community is now less united and
there are no more big football teams" (Coeyman 1990, B4). On
the plus side, O'Reilly stated, "Every teacher takes owner¬
ship of every student that walks through the door" (Coeyman
1990, B4). "Size isn't everything," said Joann Manning,
director of field services at the laboratory for school
success at Philadelphia's Temple University. "A smaller
school doesn't necessarily mean people are teaching in more
powerful ways. However, it does organize the school in a way
that is useful" (Coeyman 1990, B4) .
Each school and school system is different. It is
hard to predict what will happen when one attempts to move
from the normal to a smaller school, thereby creating
smaller class sizes. The research is supportive of smaller
class sizes for various reasons. One would certainly hope
that it would bring about more individualized instruction.
A leader would have to build support for any type of organ¬
izational change and hope for long-term gains in student
achievement to support it survival.
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Quality of Instruction
Limited research has been conducted in correlating
quality of instruction and merit pay. The Georgia Teacher
Evaluation Program (GTEP), the Georgia Teacher Observation
Instrument (GTOI), and the Georgia Teacher Duties and
Responsibilities Instrument (GTDRI) are designed to impact
effective instruction.
In the state of Georgia, teacher evaluation is an
attempt to monitor teachers and give feedback for the
purpose of improving instruction. Teacher evaluation is an
integral component in the process of improving teaching and
learning. The Georgia Teacher Evaluation Program (GTEP) is
designed to serve three purposes: (1) to identify and
reinforce effective teaching practices; (2) to identify
areas of strengths and weaknesses, allowing for early
intervention if a weakness is identified; and (3) to iden¬
tify teachers who do not meet the minimum standards so that
appropriate action can be taken. Appropriate action includes
having the administrator and teacher mutually develop a plan
to correct observed teaching deficiencies (Georgia Depart¬
ment of Education 1994, 4; Georgia Department of Education
1993, 1).
In the DeKalb County School System, teachers who are
new to the school or system are evaluated three times per
school year by a building-level administrator and/or a
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county-level administrator. Novice teachers are evaluated
once each school year, and then three times per year, every
two years, or as often as the principal perceives it to be
necessary.
The two assessment instruments, the Georgia Teacher
Observation Instrument (GTOI) and the Georgia Teacher Duties
and Responsibilities Instrument (GTDRI), are constructed to
gather the information necessary to accomplish the three
purposes of the annual performance evaluation mentioned
earlier. It should be noted that the observation instruments
(GTEP and GTOI) are designed to assess the basic teaching
skills that every teacher should have. This, coupled with a
strong intervention model for identified weaknesses, is why
approximately 90 percent of all teachers who complete the
assessment pass it (Georgia Department of Education 1993,
4). The instruments do not discriminate between "good" and
"excellent" teachers. According to a state department
spokesperson, to acquire that level of discrimination, it
would be necessary to adjust the instrument and provide
additional training to evaluators. However, any teacher
who fails on the three yearly evaluations (having a total of
five needs improvements [NIs] on all evaluations) will be




Increasingly, policy makers and the public are
asking for evidence to show that education reforms and
programs actually improve student performance. Many admin¬
istrators see the improvement of teacher performance as an
automatic increase in student achievement. The state of
Georgia perceives incentive bonuses as a motivator to
schools to improve both administrators' and teachers'
performance, bringing about total school-wide improvements
and greater student achievement.
Far more time, however, is devoted to implementing
reforms than to evaluating them. While anecdotal information
and subjective opinions abound, many education initiatives
lack solid evidence to show they consistently and positively
improve student achievements. The results of this study will
give some insight into these issues.
In Chapter III, Theoretical Framework, definitions
of variables and the relationship among the variables are




The purpose of this study is to investigate the
perceptions of principals and teachers regarding the Pay-
for-Performance (PfP) Program, as it relates to selected
variables, such as parental involvement, teacher motiva¬
tion, student achievement and quality of instruction in
Georgia schools. This researcher also attempts to determine
what effects school size and school location may have upon
the dependent variables before and during a school's
participation in Pay-for-Performance.
Presentation and Definition of the Variables
The definitions of variables which follow are solely
for clarification of this study.
Independent Variables
1. Principal refers to the chief building adminis¬
trator of an elementary, middle, or secondary school who
manages and controls the daily operations.
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2. Teacher refers to certified personnel who work in
the classroom; for this study, this term also includes
specialists such as guidance counselors, art and music
teachers, librarians, etc., who give instruction and/or
impart knowledge to students.
3. Pay-for-Performance refers to a school improve¬
ment program designed to promote exemplary performance and
collaboration at the school level. The program is open to
all K-12 public schools in Georgia. Pay-for-Performance
awards are made to schools rather than to individuals
(Georgia Department of Education 1997, 1) .
4. Principal and teacher perception refers to the
attitudes and opinions held by school personnel toward Pay-
for-Performance with respect to participating in this
incentive pay program.
Dependent Variables
5. Parental involvement refers to experiences that
are afforded to the students by their parents in both the
living (e.g., reads to children at home) and school
environments (attends school activities, such as parent
conferences) that foster and enhance student success in
school.
6. Teacher motivation refers to the exertion of
self-effort and persistence demonstrated by teachers in
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working toward the accomplishment of the school's objec¬
tives, goals, and mission.
7. Student achievement refers to the academic
performance of students on comparable standardized tests in
the areas of reading comprehension and mathematics, which
will be measured by the total on each school's building
grade-level profile reports. This will be the national
percentile rank (NPR) scores for Grades 3, 5, and 8 before
PfP (1995-96) and during PfP (1996-97).
8. Quality of instruction refers to the exertion of
persistent efforts by principals and teachers who ensure
student mastery of Georgia's educational objectives, goals,
and mission.
Moderating Variables
9. School size refers to the student enrollment in
a school. The small schools have a population of 100 to 600
students. The large schools have a population of 601 to
1,200 students.10.School location refers to the metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan location (counties) of schools in Georgia.
These metropolitan counties are determined by the Atlanta
Regional Commission (see appendix A). The ten-county Atlanta
metropolitan region includes Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb,
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DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, and
Rockdale Counties.
Relationships Among the Variables
In this section the researcher discusses the
relationships between and among the variables of the study.
There are two independent variables, the perceptions of
principals and teachers relative to Pay-for-Performance. The
moderating variables are school size and school location.
The dependent or outcome variables are parental involvement,
teacher motivation, student achievement, and quality of
instruction. The researcher contends that these variables
are related and may have some significance for the Pay-for-
Performance Program. A diagram of the variables and their
relationship is illustrated in fig. 1 (appendix B).
It is critical that principals and teachers have
similar perceptions about the school's objectives, goals,
mission, and school programs. Without consensus and common
perceptions among all stakeholders, the organization is
often dysfunctional and ineffective. It is very difficult to
implement any type of school reform that enhances student
achievement without collegiality, teamwork, and a common
vision. When perceptions about a school program, like the
Pay-for-Performance, are contradictory, teacher motivation.
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student achievement, and quality of instruction may be
negatively impacted.
The Pay-for-Performance (PfP) Program is designed to
help schools better educate children. In implementing a
program of this type, it is essential that the school
climate is positive. Often a program of this type enhances
the existing school climate. If teachers are not physically
and psychologically content within a school, they are less
apt to perform at maximum levels. When implementing a PfP
Program, it is critical that the stakeholders in a school
have good morale and feel good about their jobs and the
working environment. Without a positive school climate, the
most well-prepared Pay-for-Performance proposal will be
difficult to implement successfully.
In schools with a positive school climate, teachers
are generally very motivated. Teacher motivation is a
necessary quality for Pay-for-Performance implementation.
Motivation is the "drive" within a school that keeps it
afloat. If teachers are not motivated, they exert minimal
efforts, physically and psychologically, toward school
reform or other such programs. The school leader (principal)
plays a major role in this process. If the principal cannot
motivate the staff to participate in Pay-for-Performance or
other reform programs, then he or she may also have an
ineffective principalship and a minimal impact on student
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achievement. The principal should be able to influence and
inspire all staff members to become motivated, especially in
implementing and achieving a Pay-for-Performance proposal.
Student achievement, the ultimate goal, results in part from
motivated teachers teaching in a positive school climate.
School size and school location may also have an
impact on the implementation of a Pay-for-Performance
program. A larger school, generally speaking, will have a
more difficult task of gaining consensus among the staff
members because of the many varied and diverse needs that
exist within the organization. It is often necessary to do
extensive team building with large staffs. Communication
channels are essential in working with a large staff because
finding a meeting time that is convenient for all involved
parties is sometimes difficult. The location of a school may
also have some implications on the implementation of a
proposed Pay-for-Performance plan. Metropolitan and non¬
metropolitan schools have different needs in some respects.
Principals and teachers in these schools, respectively, may
have different perceptions about teacher motivation,
parental involvement, and the quality of instruction during
Pay-for-Performance and its implementation.
Parental involvement is a major component of effec¬
tive schools. James P. Comer (1988) and others have stressed
the importance of cooperation between educators and parents
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and parental participation in school decision making. The
Pay-for-Performance guidelines specifically state that there
must be objectives that focus on building parental support
and involvement. Reform programs, like the Pay-for-
Performance, attempt to promote parental involvement in
children's education. When reform strategies relative to
parental involvement are implemented in schools, teachers
and principals may be more likely to perceive that parents
have ownership in school programs and are partners in
learning.
Student achievement is the ultimate objective of any
school program. Staff perceptions of Pay-for-Performance,
parental involvement, teacher motivation, quality of
instruction, school size, and school location may impact
student achievement. When these variables work together in a
positive manner, students become successful learners and
perform well in the academic arena.
Null Hypotheses
The following null hypotheses were developed for
this study.
1. There is no significant relationship between
parental involvement before PfP and parental involvement
during PfP as perceived by principals.
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2. There is no significant relationship between
parental involvement before PfP and parental involvement
during PfP as perceived by teachers.
3. There is no significant relationship between
teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation during
PfP as perceived by principals.
4. There is no significant relationship between
teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation during
PfP as perceived by teachers.
5. There is no significant relationship between
quality of instruction before PfP and quality of instruction
during PfP as perceived by principals.
6. There is no significant relationship between
quality of instruction before PfP and quality of instruction
during PfP as perceived by teachers.
7. There is no significant difference between
parental involvement before PfP and parental involvement
during PfP as perceived by principals.
8. There is no significant difference between
parental involvement before PfP and parental involvement
during PfP as perceived by teachers.
9. There is no significant difference between
teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation during
PfP as perceived by principals.
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10. There is no significant difference between
teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation during
PfP as perceived by teachers.
11. There is no significant difference between
student reading achievement before PfP and student reading
achievement during PfP in terms of (a) Grade 3, (b) Grade 5,
and (c) Grade 8.
12. There is no significant difference between
student math achievement before PfP and student math
achievement during PfP in terms of (a) Grade 3, (b) Grade 5,
and (c) Grade 8.
13. There is no significant difference between
quality of instruction before PfP and quality of instruc¬
tion during PfP as perceived by principals.
14. There is no significant difference between
quality of instruction before PfP and quality of instruc¬
tion during PfP as perceived by teachers.
15. There is no significant difference between
principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance
and parental involvement in terms of school size.
16. There is no significant difference between
principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance
and parental involvement in terms of school location.
60
17. There is no significant difference between
principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance
and teacher motivation in terms of school size.
18. There is no significant difference between
principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance
and teacher motivation in terms of school location.
19. There is no significant difference between
principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance
and the quality of instruction in terms of school size.
20. There is no significant difference between
principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-Performance
and the quality of instruction in terms of school location.
Limitations of the Study
The following limitations should be noted and kept
in mind as the findings of the study are reviewed:
1. The sample of participants was limited to
elementary and middle schools which achieved Pay-for-
Performance during the 1996-97 school year. The population
was small; it included twenty-five elementary schools and
ten middle schools. The modest size of the sample limits the
generalizations of findings to this study.
2. The study was confined to two school types,
elementary and middle, in Georgia; therefore, unique
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features of the population may limit the generalization of
results.
3. Four schools in the study achieved Pay-for-
Performance during two consecutive school years (1995-96 and
1996-97). This fact may have had a casual impact on the
results of the study.
4. This study was limited to the analysis of per¬
ception of selected Georgia public school principals and
teachers regarding the effectiveness of Pay-for-Performance
upon the performance of students, teachers, and parents.
5. The researcher surveyed all elementary and middle
school PfP winners for 1996-97. Only the willing partici¬
pants (schools) in the population group chose to respond,
malcing this a self-selection process.
Summary
This research investigation was conducted to deter¬
mine if there are any significant relationships and/or
differences between parental involvement, teacher motiva¬
tion, student achievement, and quality of instruction in
schools before and during participation in Pay-for-
Performance, as perceived by principals and teachers.
Research data with selected school personnel will indicate
if a relationship exists between the perceptions of the
dependent variable. These data will also determine if
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teachers and principals differ in their perceptions of
parental involvement, teacher motivation, and the quality
of instruction. This investigation will be moderated by
school size and location. The level of interaction of the
moderating variables will be measured as significant or not
significant.
Chapter IV discusses the methods and procedures that
the investigator utilized in this study. The study design,
description of the setting, sampling procedures, description
of the instrument, and other relative topics are discussed.
CHAPTER IV
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
The methods and procedures that were used to conduct
this study are described in this chapter. This chapter
includes: (1) research design, (2) description of the set¬
ting, (3) working with human subjects, (4) description of
the instrument, (5) validity and reliability of the instru¬
ment, (6) statistical applications, and (8) summary.
Design of the Study
This study utilized a quantitative design since data
were collected via a survey. The researcher used this
research design because it allows investigation of rela¬
tively large amounts of data and subjects. The data gathered
have been analyzed using descriptive statistics and tests of
statistical significance. Quantitative research is a design
that relies on statistical methods of data analysis to study
representative samples or a complete population in order to




This research design has inquiry that is grounded in
the assumption that features of the social environment
constitute an objective reality that is relatively constant
across time and settings. The dominant methodology is to
describe and explain features of this reality by collecting
numerical data on observable behaviors of samples and by
subjecting the data to statistical analysis (Gall, Borg, and
Gall 1996).
Description of the Setting
The population of the study consisted of twenty-five
elementary schools and ten middle schools in the state of
Georgia. A list of schools which made Pay-for-Performance
in the 1996-97 school year was furnished by the Georgia
Department of Education, Several school systems of different
sizes, in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas of Georgia
was the setting for the conduction of the study. Each school
system has school(s) that have won the Pay-for-Performance
incentive award during the 1996-97 school year. All of these
Pay-for-Performance schools were included in the target
population. Not only are these schools different from a
geographic perspective, they also vary in ethnic composi¬
tion, student enrollment, socioeconomic status, and school
configuration. Elementary and middle schools were included
in this study. Principals and teachers in the selected
Pay-for-Performance schools had the opportunity to parti¬
cipate in a survey.
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Sampling Procedures
The population group consisted of principals and
teachers in the 1996-97 achieving Pay-for-Performance
schools. This decision and/or choice is based on the fact
that these individuals are in the schools and actually
working with the students. Major decisions in the writing of
the Pay-for-Performance proposal for incentive pay are made
by the principal and the teachers.
The contact person in each school, which was the
principal, was asked to distribute the surveys to their
teaching staff who were employed at the school during the
1995-97 school years and to complete a survey themselves.
The researcher surveyed all elementary and middle school
PfP winners for the 1996-97 school year. Only the willing
participants (schools) in the population group chose to
respond, making this a self-selection process.
Working with Human Subjects
It was necessary to obtain permission (see appendix
C) from some school systems to conduct this study. In
DeKalb, Cobb, and Atlanta School Systems the request was
made to the Research Specialist. A copy of the proposal
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accompanied with a cover letter was submitted to the Georgia
Department of Education to secure necessary Iowa Tests of
Basic Skills (ITBS) scores for the 1995-96 and 1996-97
school years in reading comprehension and mathematics totals
for Grades 3, 5, and 8, and to obtain permission to conduct
the study. Telephone conversations were made and postcard
mailings were sent to follow up and ensure that the surveys
were completed and properly returned.
All participants were afforded discretion and
anonymity. A protective measure was taken to ensure that
participants felt comfortable while participating in this
study. This precaution included providing each participant
an envelope in which to seal their survey before returning
it completed to the contact person for the group mailing.
Description of the Instrument
The researcher was unsuccessful in attempts to
locate and identify a suitable authenticated instrument that
would facilitate the types of questions and responses needed
to adequately collect the data needed for this study. The
instrument was developed by the researcher after reviewing
several survey samples and following suggestions of Gall,
Borg and Gall (1996) . The variables of this study were:
principals’ and teachers' perceptions of the PfP program
(dependent variables) and teacher motivation, parent
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involvement, and the quality of instruction (independent
variables). A Likert-type survey (see appendix D) with a
discrepancy scale which consisted of 45 statements was
administered to the participants in this study. The
statements are based on three components in regard to PfP:
quality of instruction, teacher motivation, and parent
involvement. Items 1-23 on the survey refer to quality of
instruction. Items 24-33 pertain to teacher motivation.
Items 34-45 make reference to parental involvement. Two
cover letters (see appendix E) were developed to explain the
survey to the participants (principals and teachers). After
the participants completed the surveys, the principal
returned them to the researcher in a sealed, self-addressed,
stamped envelope.
Development of the Instrument
In constructing the instrument, some basic steps
suggested by Borg and Gall (1996) were used as a guide.
Several items were developed on the survey to measure each
variable under study, except student achievement. The
student achievement was measured using hard data (ITBS test
results) that were retrieved from the Georgia Department of
Education.
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Validity and Reliability of the Instrument
The survey was read by a panel of readers (educa¬
tors) chosen from a school not participating in the study to
ensure clarity of the survey. These educators came from
three DeKalb County schools not included in the study. Each
member of the panel evaluated the instrument individually,
followed by a collective evaluation. Items on the instriiment
were modified and/or changed using commentary from the
panel. A pilot test was given to a select group for addi¬
tional feedback. A statistical reliability test was also
administered after the data were collected.
Data Collection Procedures
In order to ensure the efficient collection of data,
this researcher obtained addresses of schools which made PfP
in 1996-97 from the 1998 Public Education Directory, pub¬
lished by the Georgia Department of Education. The data
collection procedures were the same in each school. The
permission letter (if applicable), the cover letters, and
the surveys were mailed to each respective site, with a
return stamped envelope.
After initial contact was made with each school, a
follow-up telephone call was made to each school contact
person to check on progress and ensure that data were
properly returned. Finally, postcards were mailed to remind
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the principals to mail back the surveys in a timely manner.
The surveys were coded so that the researcher could identify
the responses for each school and each respondent and to
ensure that data could be properly analyzed.
Statistical Applications
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient
(£), also known as Pearson £, was the technique used to
analyze the degree of relationship between two variables.
The Pearson r is computed when both variables that are
desired to be correlated are expressed as continuous scores
(Gall, Borg, and Gall 1996). Research Questions 1-6 and
associated Null Hypotheses 1-6 were analyzed using the
Pearson product-moment correlation.
Research Questions 7-14 and the associated null
hypotheses were analyzed using t tests. School position
(principals or teachers) and school size (small or large)
were the factors in an analysis using teacher motivation,
paren-tal involvement, and quality of instruction as the
dependent variables. The analysis determined first if there
was an interaction between the school position and school
size: Does perception in the levels of one of the indepen¬
dent variables depend on the levels of the other independent
variables? If there was no significant interaction, then
main effects were tested to determine if the separate
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factors showed significant differences on any of the three
dependent variables.
According to Tuckman (1994, 273), "a t. test is a
statistical test that allows you to compare two means to
determine the probability that the difference between the
means is a real difference rather than a chance difference."
This test was used to reach conclusion in regard to several
of the hypotheses in this study.
Research Questions 15-20 and associated null
hypotheses were analyzed using a 2x2 analysis of variance
(ANOVA); school position and school location and school
position and school size were the factors, using the teacher
motivation, parental involvement, and quality of instruction
as the dependent variables. The same significance testing
was conducted to find if there were any interactions or main
effects. School achievement was the dependent variable in
this analysis, while the other variables became the cri¬
terion or independent variables. The moderating variables,
school size (as a continuous variable) and school location,
were entered into the equation first. After the amount of
variance of these moderating variables was assessed, then
the other variables (teachers' and principals' perceptions
of teacher motivation, parental involvement, and quality of
instruction) were entered in a stepwise procedure to be
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evaluated for what each adds to the prediction over and
above the set of moderating variables.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is the statistical
technique that was used to analyze the data from the
surveys. The significance level was set at .05 to interpret
the data and significant findings. The data were entered
into a computer for a computer analysis after being
collected and coded. The school location variable indicates
whether or not the school was located in one of the ten
metropolitan counties as determined by the Atlanta Regional
Commission (see appendix A). Schools so located within the
region were coded 1, and those not in the metropolitan
region were coded 2. The principals were coded 3, and the
teachers were coded 4 for data entry.
ANOVA was the statistical tool used to measure
variance between and among the variables. The ANOVA is a
procedure for determining whether the difference between the
mean scores of two or more groups on a dependent variable is
statistically significant (Gall, Borg, and Gall 1996).
Measurement of the variable of student achievement
occurred via an analysis of the building level Iowa Tests of
Basic Skills (ITBS) data. The ITBS reading comprehension and
mathematics total scores of Grades 3 and 5 in elementary
schools and Grade 8 for middle schools for the 1995-96 and
1996-97 school years were analyzed.
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Swmgry
A quantitative approach was used in this study. All
Pay-for-Performance elementary and middle schools in Georgia
which won the 1996-97 incentive comprised the target popu¬
lation. In Chapter V the data are analyzed and the tables
relative to this study are presented and discussed.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine the
perceptions of principals and teachers pertaining to the
effectiveness of the Pay-for-Performance (PfP) Program in
the state of Georgia as it relates to parental involvement,
teacher motivation, student achievement, and the quality of
instruction. This chapter provides an analysis of the data
generated by the survey and the statistical measures
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences [SPSS]) used to
test the hypotheses. Furthermore, this study proposed to
determine if there was a difference or a relationship
between the perceptions of principals and teachers in regard
to the selected variables.
During the 1996-97 school year (July 1, 1996,
through June 30, 1997), 25 elementary schools and 10 middle
schools in the state of Georgia won Pay-for-Performance
(PfP) awards (see appendix F). These 35 schools formed the
sample for the study. This researcher investigated the
status of parental involvement, teacher motivation, student
achievement, and quality of instruction for the 1995-96
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(July 1, 1995, through June 30, 1996) school year to deter¬
mine if these dependent variables increased, decreased, or
remained the same during the PfP school year (1996-97), as
perceived by principals and teachers.
Surveys were used to gather data for this study, and
the computer programs of the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) were used to analyze the data. A
total of 21 principals and 140 teachers from 13 elementary
schools and 3 middle schools representing the population
responded to the survey. The number of principals and
teachers of eighth graders is a very small number on which
to perform statistical analyses. Therefore, not much
credence can be given to this outcome.
The independent variables were examined to determine
if a relationship or difference existed between and among
the variables that were studied. The independent variables
were principals’ and teachers’ perceptions of PfP. The
dependent variables were parental involvement, teacher
motivation, quality of instruction, and student achievement.
Two moderating variables, school size and school location,
were analyzed to determine their impact upon the dependent
variables. An analysis of each variable was performed
separately based on the null hypotheses. Pearson product-
moment (Pearson r) correlations were used in analyzing the
data to indicate relationship. Analysis of variance (ANOVA)
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was applied to indicate differences. The level of signifi¬
cance was set at .05.
Table 2 lists the schools and the number of respon¬
dents from each. There are as few as four respondents in
several of the schools. Although this researcher desired
more than four respondents per school, the selection process
was voluntarily coti^leted. A total of 161 completed ques¬
tionnaires were received from 16 schools.
TABLE 2
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS PER SCHOOL (n = 161)
School Number Teachers Principals Total Percent
1 6 1 7 4.3
2 12 2 14 8.7
3 8 3 11 6.8
4 6 1 7 4.3
5 12 1 13 8.1
6 10 0 10 6.2
7 12 1 13 8.1
8 12 1 13 8.1
9 5 1 6 3.7
10 3 1 4 2.5
11 1 3 4 2.5
12 2 2 4 2.5
13 6 3 9 5.6
14 15 0 15 9.3
15 6 0 6 3.7
16 22 3 25 15.5
Total 138 23 161 100.0
Table 3 shows that more teachers responded to the
survey than principals, which was anticipated by the
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TABLE 3
SCHOOL LOCATION: RESPONDENTS FROM METROPOLITAN
AND NONMETROPOLITAN SCHOOLS {n = 161)
School Location Position n % of Grand Total
Metropolitan Principal 15 9
Teacher 72 45
Total 87 54
Nonmetropolitan Principal 6 4
Teacher 68 42
Total 74 46
Grand Total 161 100
researcher. Also, more responses were received from metro¬
politan areas than from nonmetropolitan areas.
Table 4 reveals that in 1995-96 more than half (55
percent) of the respondents came from small schools.
TABLE 4
SCHOOL SIZE: RESPONDENTS FROM LARGE AND SMALL SCHOOLS,
1995-96, BEFORE PfP (n = 161)
School Size Position ri % (of Grand Total
Small (to 600 Principal 8 5
enrollment) Teacher 80 50
Total 88 55
Large (> 600 Principal 13 8
enrollment) Teacher 60 37
Total 73 45
Grand Total 161 100
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Table 5 indicates that some of the schools lost
enrollment over the course of the PfP year. In 1996-97, only
37 percent of the respondents were in a large school (more
than 600 students).
TABLE 5
SCHOOL SIZE: RESPONDENTS FROM LARGE AND SMALL SCHOOLS,
1996-97, DURING PfP (n = 161)
School Size Position n % of Grand Total
Small (to 600 Principal 9 5
enrollment) Teacher 93 58
Total 102 63
Large (> 600 Principal 12 8
enrollment) Teacher 47 29
Total 59 37
Grand Total 161 100
Null Hypotheses and Analysis of Data
To quantify the results of the questionnaire survey,
the numerical values of 4, 3, 2, and 1 were assigned to 45
items. It was a discrepancy instrument that surveyed the
respondents before PfP and during PfP on the measured vari¬
ables. Items 1-23 on the questionnaire reported data on the
quality of instruction variable. Items 24-34 gathered
information on teacher motivation, and Items 35-45 solicited
data on parental involvement.
Respondents were asked to answer each item on a
four-point Likert scale. The responses to the instrument
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were: 4 = Strongly Agree, 3 = Agree, 2 = Disagree, and 1 =
Strongly Disagree. Two Likert scales were offered for each
question, one for Before PfP (1995-96) and one for During
PfP (1996-97) . The data from those responses were used to
test the hypotheses.
This chapter examines and analyzes data related to
the twenty hypotheses outlined in Chapter III. The findings
of the data analysis are presented in tabular format along
with accompanying narratives. The hypotheses were reviewed
and accepted or rejected based on the accompanying data.
For the purpose of this study, twenty null
hypotheses were tested. Null Hypotheses 1-6 were tested
using Pearson r correlation to test for relationship.
Null Hypotheses 7-14 were analyzed using the test to test
for difference. Null Hypotheses 15-20 used analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to measure difference. The data for the
Pay-for-Performance instrument were tabulated, and the
findings are presented in tables and explained through
accompanying narratives in the following paragraphs.
Hypothesis 1. There is no significant relationship
between parental involvement before PfP and parental
involvement during PfP as perceived by principals.
The data with respect to this hypothesis are shown
in table 6. A correlational analysis was used to establish
significance for Hypothesis 1. In the table, the mean score
for parental involvement before PfP (1995-96) was 2.70,
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TABLE 6
RESULTS OF CORRELATION OF PRINCIPALS' PERCEPTIONS OF
PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT BEFORE AND DURING THE








Before PfP 20 2.70 0.74
Parental
Involvement
During PfP 20 2.89 0.74
.89 .000*
*Signifleant at or beyond the .05 level.
Note: Critical r = .433.
compared to a parental involvement during PfP (1996-97) of
2.89. The correlation between parental involvement before
PfP and parental involvement during PfP, as perceived by
principals, was .89. The findings showed that, based on the
principals' perceptions, there was a significant relation¬
ship between the level of parental involvement before and
during PfP. Null Hypothesis 1 was thus rejected.
On the surface, those two means only had a 0.19
difference in mean scores, which was a slight margin. How¬
ever, the correlation for that significant relationship
yielded results beyond the .05 level. The data indicated
that the principals felt parental involvement to be higher
during PfP.
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Hypothesis 2. There is no significant relationship
between parental involvement before PfP and parental
involvement during PfP as perceived by teachers.
The analysis of the data with respect to Null
Hypothesis 2 is shown in table 7. According to the teachers'
perception, the mean score for the parental involvement
before PfP (1995-96) was 2.59, compared to a parental
involvement during PfP (1996-97) of 2.82. The correlation
between parental involvement before and during PfP was .71.
The findings showed that there was a significant
relationship between the level of parental involvement
before and during PfP. Therefore, Null Hypothesis 2 was
rejected.
TABLE 7
RESULTS OF CORRELATION OF TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF
PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT BEFORE AND DURING THE








Before PfP 137 2.59 0.71
Parental
Involvement
During PfP 137 2.82 0.51
.71 .000*
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
Note: Critical r = .195.
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The parental involvement during PfP had a signifi¬
cantly higher rating than the parental involvement before
PfP, from the teachers’ perceptions. From the statistical
testing, those facts indicated that the PfP program con¬
tributed to increased parental involvement.
Hypothesis 3. There is no significant relationship
between teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation
during PfP as perceived by principals.
The data with respect to this hypothesis are shown
in table 8. In this table, the perception of the principals
revealed a mean score of 2.94 for the teacher motivation
before PfP and a mean score of 3.11 for the teacher motiva¬
tion during PfP. The correlation was .57.
TABLE 8
RESULTS OF CORRELATION OF PRINCIPALS' PERCEPTIONS OF
TEACHER MOTIVATION BEFORE AND DURING THE
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PROGRAM (n = 21)
Standard Signif.
Variable n Mean Deviation £ of £
Teacher
Motivation




During PfP 21 3.11 0.56
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
Note: Critical r = .433.
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The findings showed that, based on the principals'
perceptions, there was a significant relationship between
teacher motivation before PfP and during PfP; hence. Null
Hypothesis 3 was rejected.
The principals rated teacher motivation during PfP
higher than before PfP. Data and statistical testing indi¬
cated that PfP stimulated higher teacher motivation.
Hypothesis 4. There is no significant relationship
between teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation
during PfP as perceived by teachers.
The mean teacher motivation before PfP was 3.48,
which was greater than a mean motivation during PfP of 3.20.
The results indicated a significant relation (.48) beyond
the .05 level. It appeared to the teachers participating in
this study that teacher motivation was greater during PfP
than before PfP. Thus, data indicated that the teachers'
perceptions for both school years showed a positive
significant relationship.
The results in table 9 show a significant relation¬
ship between teacher motivation before PfP and teacher
motivation during PfP. The findings indicated that there was
a significant relationship between the two. Null Hypothesis
4 was rejected.
At a glance, it would appear that there was not a
significant relationship between the two years, since there
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TABLE 9
RESULTS OF CORRELATION OF TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF
TEACHER MOTIVATION BEFORE AND DURING THE








Before PfP 137 3.20 0.63
Teacher
Motivation
During PfP 137 3.48 0.57
.48 .000*
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
Note: Critical r = .195.
was only 0.28 difference between the mean scores. The
results of the correlations indicated that PfP increased
teacher motivation, as perceived by the teachers.
Hypothesis 5. There is no significant relationship
between quality of instruction before PfP and quality of
instruction during PfP as perceived by principals.
The data with respect to Null Hypothesis 5 are shown
in table 10. The mean score for quality of instruction was
2.96, and the mean score for quality of instruction during
PfP was 3.42. The calculated difference between quality of
instruction before and during PfP, as perceived by princi¬
pals, was .67, a significant relationship at the .05 level.
The data in this study revealed a significant relationship
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TABLE 10
RESULTS OF CORRELATION OF PRINCIPALS' PERCEPTIONS OF
QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION BEFORE AND DURING THE








Before PfP 21 2.96 0.47
Quality of
Instruction
During PfP 21 3.42 0.36
.67 .001*
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
Note; Critical r = .433.
between quality of instruction before and during PfP, as
perceived by the principals. Therefore, Null Hypothesis 5
was rejected.
According to the principals, the mean rating scores
of both years indicated that the quality of instruction was
greater during PfP than before PfP. The significance of r
showed that the chance of that phenomenon occurring was
highly significant at the .001 level.
Hypothesis 6. There is no significant relationship
between quality of instruction before PfP and quality of
instruction during PfP as perceived by teachers.
The data with respect to Hypothesis 6 revealed that
the mean for quality of instruction before PfP was 3.13 and
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that the mean for quality of instruction during PfP was 3.46
(see table 11). A total of 139 teachers responded to the
before PfP survey items, and 138 responded to the during PfP
items. The correlation between the quality of instruction
before PfP and during PfP was .62, which was significant at
the .05 level.
TABLE 11
RESULTS OF CORRELATION OF TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS OF
QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION BEFORE AND DURING THE








Before PfP 138 3.13 0.44
Quality of
Instruction
During PfP 138 3.46 0.42
.62 .000*
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
Note: Critical r = .195.
The statistical findings relating to the teachers'
perceptions of the quality of instruction indicated that
there was a significant relationship between the quality of
instruction before and during PfP. Thus, Null Hypothesis 6
was rejected.
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The data related to Hypothesis 6 indicated that
increased quality of instruction was obtained during a
school’ s participation in PfP, as perceived by the
principals.
Hypothesis 7. There is no significant difference
between parental involvement before PfP and parental
involvement during PfP as perceived by principals.
The data with respect to this hypothesis are shown
in table 12. The mean score for parental involvement before
PfP was 2.70, and the mean score for parental involvement
during PfP was 2.89. The calculated £. value between the
two scores is -2.48, which was significant beyond the .05
level.
TABLE 12
RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLES t TEST OF PRINCIPALS'
PERCEPTIONS OF PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT BEFORE AND
DURING THE PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PROGRAM (n = 20)
Standard Signif.
Variable n Mean Deviation r of r
Parental
Involvement




During PfP 20 2.89 0.74
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
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The findings showed that, based on the principals'
perceptions, there was a significant increase in parental
involvement during PfP. The principals felt that there was
greater parental involvement in the schools during PfP than
before PfP. Therefore, Null Hypothesis 7 was rejected.
Hypothesis 8. There is no significant difference
between parental involvement before PfP and parental
involvement during PfP as perceived by teachers.
The data with respect to this hypothesis are shown
in table 13. The mean score for parental involvement before
PfP was 2.60, and the mean score for parental involvement
during PfP was 2.82. The calculated t. value between the
two scores was -5.10, which was significant beyond the .05
level.
TABLE 13
RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLES t TEST OF TEACHERS'
PERCEPTIONS OF PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT BEFORE AND








Before PfP 137 2.60 0.71
Parental
Involvement
During PfP 137 2.82 0.61
-5.10 < .01*
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
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The findings showed that, based on the teachers'
perceptions, there was an increase in parental involvement
during PfP. The teacher respondents of this survey detected
that parental involvement was greater during PfP than before
PfP. Therefore, Null Hypothesis 8 was rejected.
Hypothesis 9. There is no significant difference
between teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation
during PfP as perceived by principals.
The data with respect to this hypothesis are shown
in table 14. The mean score for teacher motivation before
PfP was 2.94, and the mean score for the teacher motivation
during PfP was 3.11. The calculated t value between the two
was -1.47, which was not significant at the .05 level.
TABLE 14
RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLES t TEST OF PRINCIPALS'
PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHER MOTIVATION BEFORE AND DURING
THE PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PROGRAM (n = 21)
Standard Signif.
Variable n Mean Deviation £ of r
Teacher
Motivation




During PfP 21 2.82 0.61
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The findings showed that, based on the principals'
perceptions, there was no significant difference in teacher
motivation before PfP and teacher motivation during PfP.
Therefore, Null Hypothesis 9 was accepted.
Hypothesis 10. There is no significant difference
between teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation
during PfP as perceived by teachers.
The data with respect to this hypothesis are shown
in table 15. The mean score for teacher motivation before
PfP was 3.21, and the mean score for teacher motivation
during PfP was 3.48. The calculated t value between the two
was -5.16, which was significant beyond the .05 level.
TABLE 15
RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLES £. TEST OF TEACHERS'
PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHER MOTIVATION BEFORE AND








Before PfP 137 3.21 0.63
Teacher
Motivation
During PfP 137 3.48 0.57
-5.16 < .01*
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
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The findings showed that, based on the teachers'
perceptions, there was a significant increase from teacher
motivation before PfP to teacher motivation during PfP.
Therefore, Null Hypothesis 10 was rejected.
Hypothesis 11. There is no significant difference
between student reading achievement before PfP and student
reading achievement during PfP in terms of (a) Grade 3,
(b) Grade 5, and (c) Grade 8.
Student achievement data for ITBS reading and math
were retrieved from the Georgia Department of Education
database for each school by grade level. The data with
respect to reading scores are shown in table 16.
The mean score for third grade reading before PfP
was 46.2 and third grade reading during PfP was 47.5. The
calculated value between the two scores was -0.50, which
was not significant at or beyond the .05 level. The findings
showed that there was no difference between the student
achievement in reading before PfP and during PfP for the
third grade. Therefore, Null Hypothesis 11a was accepted.
As shown in table 16, the mean score for fifth grade
reading before PfP was 50.0 and fifth grade reading during
PfP was 49.3. The calculated £. value was 0.78, which was not
significant at the .05 level. The findings of the t test
showed that there was no difference between the student
reading achievement before and during PfP for fifth graders.
Therefore, Null Hypothesis lib was accepted.
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TABLE 16
RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLES £. TEST FOR THIRD, FIFTH,
AND EIGHTH GRADE ITBS READING COMPREHENSION
ACHIEVEMENT SCORES FOR 1995-96 (BEFORE PfP)
AND 1996-97 (DURING PfP) (n = 16)
Variable n Mean SD L £
3rd Grade Reading
Before PfP 13 46.2 13.8
-0.50 .63
3rd Grade Reading
During PfP 13 47.5 13.2
5th Grade Reading
Before PfP 13 50.0 9.9
0.29 .78
5th Grade Reading
During PfP 13 49.3 9.6
8th Grade Reading
Before PfP 3 52.0 4.9
-0.61 .60
8th Grade Reading
During PfP 3 53.3 2.5
The data with respect to the eighth grade reading
scores are shown in table 16. The mean score for eighth
grade reading before PfP was 52.0 and the mean score for
eighth grade reading during PfP was 53.3. The calculated £.
value between the two scores is -0.61, which was not
significant at the .05 level. The findings showed that there
was no difference between the student reading achievement
before and during PfP for eighth graders. Therefore, Null
Hypothesis 11c was accepted.
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Hypothesis 12. There is no significant difference
between student math achievement before PfP and student math
achievement during PfP in terms of (a) Grade 3, (b) Grade 5,
and (c) Grade 8.
Data for the ITBS math student achievement before
PfP and during PfP were retrieved from the Georgia Depart¬
ment of Education database for each school by grade level.
The data with respect to math scores are presented in
table 17.
TABLE 17
RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLES t TEST FOR THIRD, FIFTH,
AND EIGHTH GRADE ITBS MATH ACHIEVEMENT SCORES FOR
1995-96 (BEFORE PfP) AND 1996-97 (DURING PfP) (n = 16)
Variable n Mean SD L P
3rd Grade Math
Before PfP 13 50.5 13.3
-2.18 .05*
3rd Grade Math
During PfP 13 57.2 9.8
5th Grade Math
Before PfP 13 51.8 9.4
-0.21 .84
5th Grade Math
During PfP 13 53.3 16.5
8th Grade Math
Before PfP 3 58.3 2.5
0.00 1.00
8th Grade Math
During PfP 3 58.3 6.0
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
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The data with respect to third grade math scores are
shown in table 17. The mean score for third grade math
before PfP was 50.5 and the mean score for third grade
math during PfP was 57.2. The calculated £. value between the
two scores was -2.18, which was significant at the .05
level. The findings showed that there was a significant
difference between student math achievement before and
during PfP for third graders. Therefore, Null Hypothesis 12a
was rejected.
As shown in table 17, the mean score for fifth grade
math before PfP was 51.8 and fifth grade math during PfP was
53.3. The calculated t value was -0.21 with a p value of
.84, which was not significant at the .05 level. The find¬
ings of the t test showed that there was no difference
between student math achievement before and during PfP for
fifth graders. Therefore, Null Hypothesis I2b was rejected.
As shown in table 17, the mean score for eighth
grade math before PfP is 58.3 and eighth grade math during
PfP was 58.3. The calculated t value was 0.00 with a p value
of 1.00, which was not significant at the .05 level. The
findings of the p test showed that there was no difference
between student math achievement before and during PfP for
eighth graders. Therefore, Null Hypothesis 12c was rejected.
Hypothesis 13. There is no significant difference
between cpaality of instruction before PfP and quality of
instruction during PfP as perceived by principals.
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The data with respect to this hypothesis are shown
in table 18. The mean score for quality of instruction
before PfP was 2.96, and the mean score for quality of
instruction during PfP was 3.42. The calculated £. value
between the two was -5.96, which was significant beyond the
.05 level.
TABLE 18
RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLES t TEST FOR PRINCIPALS'
PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
BEFORE PfP AND DURING PfP (n = 21)
Variable n Mean SD P
Quality of
Instruction
Before PfP 21 2.96 0.47
Quality of
Instruction
During PfP 21 3.42 0.36
-5.96 <.01*
*Signifleant at or beyond the .05 level.
The findings showed that, based on the principals'
perceptions, there was a significant increase in the quality
of instruction from before PfP to during PfP. The quality of
instruction differed in a positive direction during PfP, as
indicated by the principals who responded to this survey.
Therefore, Null Hypothesis 13 was rejected.
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Hypothesis 14. There is no significant difference
between quality of instruction before PfP and quality of
instruction during PfP as perceived by teachers.
The data with respect to this hypothesis are shown
in table 19. The mean score for quality of instruction
before PfP was 3.13, and the mean score for quality of
instruction during PfP was 3.46. The calculated t value
between the two was -10.24, which was significant beyond the
.05 level.
TABLE 19
RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLES £ TEST FOR TEACHERS'
PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION
BEFORE PfP AND DURING PfP (n = 138)
Variable n Mean SD £
Quality of
Instruction
Before PfP 138 3.13 0.44
Quality of
Instruction
During PfP 138 3.46 0.43
-10.24 <.01*
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
The findings showed that, based on the teachers'
perceptions, there was a significant increase in the quality
of instruction from before PfP to during PfP. Therefore,
Null Hypothesis 14 was rejected.
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Hypothesis 15. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and parental involvement in terms of school
size,
Tables 20 and 21 provide a summary of the analysis
of Hypothesis 15. The responses from the principals and
teachers were analyzed in a 2x2 ANOVA to determine if their
perceptions of parental involvement differed according to
the size of their schools. There were no significant inter¬
actions between position (teachers and principals) and size
of school, indicating that there was no difference in
perception of parental involvement between principals and
teachers according to the size of their school. There was no
significant main effect of position, indicating that there
was no difference between teachers and principals on their
perceptions of parental involvement. There was a significant
main effect of school size, indicating that teachers and
principals in small schools (mean = 2.95) perceived higher
parental involvement than principals and teachers in large
schools (mean = 2.63).
The two-way ANOVA test produced an F of 2.275 with a
significance of .134, which was not significant at the .05
level. There was no interaction between position and school
size in regard to parental involvement. Therefore, Null
Hypothesis 15 was accepted.
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TABLE 20
DISTRIBUTION OF MEANS FOR PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT FOR
PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS IN LARGE AND SMALL
SCHOOL SIZES (a = 157)
Group
Small Schools Large Schools Total
a Mean a Mean a Mean
Principals 9 3.29 11 2.57 20 2.89
Teachers 91 2.92 46 2.64 137 2.82
Total 100 2.95 57 2.63 157 2.83
TABLE 21
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POSITION
























0.831 1 0.831 2.275 .134
Residual 55.889 153 0.365
Total 60.875 156 0.390
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
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Hypothesis 16. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and parental involvement in terms of school
location.
The survey responses were analyzed according to the
school location of the principals and teachers utilizing a
two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The 2x2 ANOVA was
computed to indicate if a significant difference existed
between the principals' and teachers' perceptions of
parental involvement in terms of school location. Tables 22
and 23 reveal the results of this analysis. There was no
significant interaction at the .05 level between positions
(teachers or principals) and location of school (metropol¬
itan or nonmetropolitan), indicating that there was no
difference in perception of parental involvement between
principals and teachers according to the location of
schools. There were also no significant main effects of
position or location, indicating no differences between
principals and teachers and no differences between metro and
nonmetro schools. Because the ANOVA revealed that there was
no difference based on location or position, Null Hypothesis
16 was accepted.
The two-way ANOVA test produced an F ratio of 0.839
with a significance of .361, which was not significant at
the .05 level. These results revealed no interaction between
the positions and locations. Like the principals and
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TABLE 22
DISTRIBUTION OF MEANS FOR PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT FOR
PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS IN METRO AND NONMETRO
LOCATIONS (q = 157)
Metro Nonmetro Total
Group E Mean n Mean n Mean
Principals 14 2.77 6 3.17 20 2.89
Teachers 71 2.78 66 2.87 137 2.82




OF VARIANCE FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POSITION
























0.328 1 0.328 0.839 .361
Residual 59.826 153 0.391
Total 60.875 156 0.390
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teachers from small schools, the principals and teachers
from the large schools felt the same about the effects of
PfP on parental involvement.
Hypothesis 17. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and teacher motivation in terms of school size.
Hypothesis 17 was assessed utilizing the ANOVA to
indicate if a significant difference existed between the
principals* and teachers’ perceptions of teacher motivation
according to the size of the school. The results are
displayed in Tables 24 and 25.
The two-way ANOVA produced an F ratio of 0.051 with
a significance of .822, which was not significant at the .05
level. There was no interaction but significant main effects
for position and school size. There was a significant
difference between small schools and large schools in the
principals' and teachers' perceptions of teacher motivation.
The principals and teachers in the small schools had a mean
score of 3.53, versus the principals and teachers in the
large schools with a mean score of 3.25.
Teacher motivation was higher in the small schools,
according to the teachers and principals who responded to
this survey. Additionally, the teachers had a mean score of
3.48 on teacher motivation, and the principals had a mean
score of 3.11. This indicates that the teachers in both the
small and large schools felt that teacher motivation was
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TABLE 24
DISTRIBUTION OF MEANS FOR TEACHER MOTIVATION FOR
PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS IN LARGE AND SMALL
SCHOOL SIZES (n = 158)
Group
Small Schools Large Schools Total
£ Mean n Mean a Mean
Principals 9 3.28 12 2.98 21 3.11
Teachers 91 3.56 46 3.32 137 3.48
Total 100 3.53 58 3.25 158 3.43
TABLE 25
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POSITION
























0.016 1 0.016 0.051 .822
Residual 48.017 154 0.312
Total 52.634 157 0.335
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
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higher than the principals in those same schools. Therefore,
Null Hypothesis 17 was rejected.
Hypothesis 18. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and teacher motivation in terms of school
location.
Hypothesis 18 was also tested using the 2x2 ANOVA
statistical test, and the results are summarized in tables
26 and 27. There was no significant interaction (.611)
between position and school location. There was no signifi¬
cant main effect of location, indicating that there was no
difference between metro and nonmetro schools in their
perceptions of teacher motivation. The position perceptions
(teachers and principals) were significantly different in
regard to teacher motivation (a significant main effect of
position). The principals in both areas (metro and nonmetro)
averaged a 3.11 mean score, while the teachers in both
locations had an average mean score of 3.48. The mean scores
revealed that the teachers again felt that teacher motiva¬
tion was higher than the principals felt teacher motivation
to be in those same schools.
The two-way ANOVA test produced an £ of 0.259 with a
significance of .611, which was not significant at the .05
level. There was no interaction between position and
location in regard to teacher motivation. Therefore, Null
Hypothesis 18 was accepted.
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TABLE 26
DISTRIBUTION OF MEANS FOR TEACHER MOTIVATION FOR
PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS IN METRO AND NONMETRO
LOCATIONS (n = 158)
Metro Nonmetro Total
Group Mean n Mean n Mean
Principals 15 .3.08 6 3.18 21 3.11
Teachers 71 3.50 66 3.46 137 3.48
Total 86 3.43 72 3.43 158 3.43
TABLE 27
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POSITION
























0.084 1 8.419 0.259 .611
Residual 50.025 154 0.325
Total 52.634 157 0.335
♦Significant at or beyond the .05 level.
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Hypothesis 19. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and the quality of instruction in terms of
school size.
Similar to Hypothesis 18, the ANOVA technique was
again applied to the data to determine if, in fact, there
was no difference between the variable of school position
(teachers and principals) and school size (large and small)
in terms of the quality of instruction. The results of this
test are shown in tables 28 and 29. The two-way ANOVA test
produced an F of 0.972 with a significance of .326, which
was not significant at the .05 level. There was no inter¬
action between position and school size in regard to quality
of instruction. Consequently, Null Hypothesis 19 was
accepted.
Hypothesis 20. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and the quality of instruction in terms of
school location.
The data for this hypothesis are presented in tables
30 and 31. There was no significant interaction between
position and school location. Also, there was no significant
main effect of school location or position, indicating that
the perceptions of principals and teachers in both metro and
nonmetro schools were the same.
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TABLE 28
DISTRIBUTION OF MEANS FOR QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION FOR
PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS IN LARGE AND SMALL
SCHOOL SIZES (n = 159)
Small Schools Large Schools Total
Group n Mean n Mean n Mean
Principals 9 3.63 12 3.26 21 3.41
Teachers 92 3.52 46 3.35 138 3.46
Total 101 3.53 58 3.33 159 3.46
TABLE 29
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POSITION
























0.163 1 0.163 0.972 .326
Residual 25.963 155 0.168
Total 27.632 158 0.175
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TABLE 30
DISTRIBUTION OF MEANS FOR QUALITY OF INSTRUCTION FOR
PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS IN METRO AND NONMETRO
LOCATIONS (n = 159)
Group
Metro Nonmetro Total
n Mean Mean B Mean
Principals 15 3.41 6 3.44 21 3.42
Teachers 71 3.43 67 3.50 138 3.46
Total 86 3.43 73 3.50 159 3.46
TABLE 31
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POSITION
























0.058 1 5.803 0.033 .856
Residual 27.408 155 0.177
Total 27.632 158 0.175
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The two-way ANOVA test produced an F with a
significance of .856, which was not significant at the .05
level. There was no interaction between position and school
location in regard to quality of instruction. Therefore,
Null Hypothesis 20 was accepted.
Summary
The data relating to the twenty hypotheses were
presented in this chapter. Each hypothesis was rejected or
accepted based on the results of the data collected from the
161 administrators and teachers who completed the question¬
naire and from the hard data retrieved from the Georgia
Department of Education via Internet.
The data for Null Hypotheses 1-6 were analyzed by
Pearson r correlations. Based on the perceptions of the
principal and teacher participants of the Pay-for-
Performance Program, there were statistically significant
relationships between parental involvement, teacher moti¬
vation, quality of instruction, and student achievement
before and during PfP. Therefore, Null Hypotheses 1-6 were
rejected.
Null Hypotheses 7-14 were tested using t. tests to
reveal statistical differences. Significant differences
between means before PfP and during PfP for teachers was
revealed for all four variables: parental involvement,
teacher motivation, quality of instruction, and student
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achievement. Significant differences were discovered for
principals on the mean before PfP and during PfP for
parental involvement, quality of instruction, and student
achievement. The principals did not perceive a difference
between the means for teacher motivation before PfP and
during PfP. For all significant before/during differences, a
larger mean score was obseirved during PfP.
The two moderating variables of school size and
school location were analyzed in Hypotheses 15-20 using
ANOVA. The results indicated there were no significant
interactions between position and school size or position
and school location. Teachers perceived teacher motivation
scores higher than principals, regardless of school location
or school size. Educators, both principals and teachers, in
small schools perceived higher parental involvement, teacher
motivation, and quality of instruction.
Chapter VI reviews the findings from this study. It
also presents conclusions and implications based on the





Findings of the Study
The testing of the hypotheses identified nineteen
significant findings. The significant findings related to
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12a, 13, 14, and 17.
Hypothesis 1. There is no significant relationship
between parental involvement before PfP and parental
involvement during PfP as perceived by principals.
The findings of Hypothesis 1 revealed that there
were significant relationships in principals' perceptions
about parental involvement and the PfP program. The parental
involvement during PfP had a higher mean rating score
than the parental involvement before PfP. The statistical
data indicated that both the before PfP and during PfP
parental involvement scored well; however, the difference
between the two groups was significant. Hypothesis 1 was
rejected.
Hypothesis 2. There is no significant relationship
between parental involvement before PfP and parental
involvement during PfP as perceived by teachers.
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The test for Hypothesis 2 indicated that there were
significant relationships in the means of the perceptions of
the teachers toward parental involvement before PfP and
parental involvement during PfP. The teachers perceived the
parents to be greatly involved in the school and its
activities during PfP. Hypothesis 2 was rejected.
Hypothesis 3. There is no significant relationship
between teacher motivation before and teacher motivation
during PfP as perceived by principals.
The test of Hypothesis 3 also revealed that there
were significant relationships in the means of the prin¬
cipals' perceptions of teacher motivation before and during
PfP. The teacher motivation was perceived by the principals
to be greater during participation in PfP. Hypothesis 3 was
rejected.
Hypothesis 4. There is no significant relationship
between teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation
during PfP as perceived by teachers.
Hypothesis 4 was rejected. The test of Hypothesis 4
verified that there was a significant relationship between
teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation during
PfP, as perceived by teachers. The perceptions of the
teachers indicated that teacher motivation was significantly
higher during participation in the PfP Program.
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Hypothesis 5. There is no significant relationship
between quality of instruction before PfP and quality of
instruction during PfP as perceived by principals.
Hypothesis 5 was rejected. The test of Hypothesis 5
verified that there was a significant relationship between
the PfP program and the quality of instruction. The percep¬
tions of the principals indicated that the quality of
instruction increased after participating in the PfP
Program.
Hypothesis 6. There is no significant relationship
between quality of instruction before PfP and quality of
instruction during PfP as perceived by teachers.
The test of Hypothesis 6 revealed that there was a
significant relationship in the means of the teachers'
perceptions with regard to the quality of instruction. The
teachers rated a higher mean score during PfP. Hypothesis 6
was rejected.
Hypothesis 7. There is no significant difference
between parental involvement before PfP and parental
involvement during PfP as perceived by principals.
The test of Hypothesis 7 indicated that there were
significant differences between parental involvement before
and during PfP. The principals' perceptions indicated that
the parental involvement in the school during PfP rated
higher than the parental involvement before PfP.
Hypothesis 7 was rejected.
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Hypothesis 8. There is no significant difference
between parental involvement before PfP and parental
involvement during PfP as perceived by teachers.
The test of Hypothesis 8 also revealed that there
were significant differences in the means of teachers' per¬
ceptions with regard to parental involvement. The teachers
indicated that parental involvement was greater during PfP
than before PfP. Null Hypothesis 8 was rejected.
Hypothesis 9. There is no significant difference
between teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation
during PfP as perceived by principals.
Hypothesis 9 was accepted. The test of Hypothesis 9
verified that there was no significant differences between
the teacher motivation before PfP and the teacher motivation
during PfP. The perception of the principals indicated that
there was not a significant difference from the teacher
motivation before PfP to the teacher motivation during PfP.
Hypothesis 10. There is no significant difference
between teacher motivation before PfP and teacher motivation
during PfP as perceived by teachers.
Hypothesis 10 was rejected. The test of this
hypothesis revealed a mean score for teacher motivation
before PfP of 3.21 and a mean score during PfP of 3.48. That
was a significant mean score and indicated that the teachers
felt that the motivation increased after participating in
the PfP Program.
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Hypothesis 11. There is no significant difference
between the student reading achievement before PfP and
the student reading achievement during PfP in terms of
(a) Grade 3, (b) Grade 5, and (c) Grade 8.
No significant differences were found on student
reading achievement before PfP and during PfP for any of
the three grades studied. Therefore, Hypotheses 11a, 11b,
and 11c were accepted.
Hypothesis 12. There is no significant difference
between the student math achievement before PfP and the
student math achievement during PfP in terms of (a) Grade 3,
(b) Grade 5, and (c) Grade 8.
A significant difference was found between third
grade math achievement scores before PfP and during PfP.
Therefore, Hypothesis 12a was rejected for third grade math.
No significant difference was found between math achievement
scores before and during PfP for the fifth or eighth grades.
Hypotheses 12b and 12c were accepted for those grades.
Hypothesis 13. There is no significant difference
between quality of instiruction before PfP and quality of
instruction during PfP as perceived by principals.
The test of Hypothesis 13 also revealed that there
were significant differences in the means of principals'
perceptions with regard to the PfP program and the quality
of instruction. The principals felt that the quality of
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instruction was significantly high during PfP. Hypothesis 13
was rejected.
Hypothesis 14. There is no significant difference
between quality of instruction before PfP and quality of
instruction during PfP as perceived by teachers.
Hypothesis 14 was rejected. The findings showed
that, based on the teachers' perceptions, there was a
significant increase from the quality of instruction before
PfP to the quality of instruction during PfP. The quality of
instruction differed in a positive direction during PfP, as
indicated by the teachers.
Additional tests were done on selected moderating
variables after an analysis of data was completed. Those
variables included the school location and the school size.
Hypothesis 15. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and parental involvement in terms of school
size.
The test for Hypothesis 15 revealed that there were
no significant interactions between position (teacher and
principal) and the size of the school, indicating that there
were no differences in perceptions of principals and
teachers on the parental involvement in the school for the
construct of school size. There was no significant main
effect on position, indicating that there was no difference
between principals and teachers on their perceptions of
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parental involvement. There was a significant main effect of
school size on the perception of the principals and teachers
in small schools as compared to the principals and teachers
in large schools. Hypothesis 15 was accepted.
Hypothesis 16. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and parental involvement in terms of school
location.
Hypothesis 16 was accepted. The test of Hypothesis
16 concluded that there was no significant difference
between Pay-for-Performance and parental involvement in
metro and nonmetro schools, as perceived by both the
principals and teachers.
Hypothesis 17. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and teacher motivation in terms of school size.
The test of Hypothesis 17 revealed several inter¬
esting things. There was no interaction; however, there was
a significant main effect (position and school size). There
was a significant difference between small schools and large
schools in the principals' and teachers' perceptions of
teacher motivation. The educators in small schools felt
teacher motivation to be higher than the educators in large
schools. In addition, the teachers in both small and large
schools felt that teacher motivation was higher than did
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the principals in those same schools. Hypothesis 17 was
rejected.
Hypothesis 18. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and teacher motivation in terms of school
location.
The test of Hypothesis 18 revealed that the metro
and nonmetro teachers had a higher mean score on teacher
motivation than the principals in both locations. The
teachers again felt that teacher motivation was higher than
did the principals. There was no other significance indi¬
cated; no interaction between the main effects and none
between metro and nonmetro schools. Hypothesis 18 was
accepted.
Hypothesis 19. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and the quality of instruction in terms of
school size.
The test of Hypothesis 19 also revealed that there
were no significant differences between the teachers' and
principals' perceptions in the small schools and the large
schools. It indicated that the educators in small schools
believed that the quality of instruction was better than
did the educators of larger schools. Hypothesis 19 was
accepted.
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Hypothesis 20. There is no significant difference
between principals' and teachers' perceptions of Pay-for-
Performance and the quality of instruction in terms of
school location.
Hypothesis 20 was accepted. The test of Hypothesis
20 revealed that there was no significant difference between
the principals' and teachers' perceptions of the quality of
instruction based on metro and nonraetro schools. There was
no interaction between the main effects of location and
position in regard to Pay-for-Performance.
Conclusions Based on the Findings
This study found that teachers perceived parental
involvement, teacher motivation, and quality of instruction
to be improved during PfP. The teachers were more positive
than the principals on these issues while participating in
the Pay-for-Performance Program. The teachers felt that
parental involvement, teacher motivation, and the quality of
instruction were all higher during PfP. The data show that
all areas of student achievement increased after PfP was
begun, with the exception of fifth grade reading; and eighth
grade math was maintained at the same mean score as before
participating in PfP. Most teachers choose to receive
additional pay for more work rather than for demonstrating
high performance (Cornett and Gaines 1994). Many schools’
PfP plans include objectives with action plans to assist in
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the attainment of their goals. In essence, the teachers are
doing more work, while exhibiting measurably higher perfor¬
mance for both themselves and the students.
In analyzing the moderating variables of school
location (metro and nonmetro) and school size, the prin¬
cipals and teachers in small schools perceived higher
parental involvement. The literature reviewed on school size
and class size suggested that smaller schools were better,
especially for younger children (primary and elementary).
The small schools give the students a sense of
belonging. Research on the relationship between size of
school population and student performance is inconclusive
(Berkey 1996), although one can readily see that a smaller
ratio of students per adult (teacher) can yield more inter¬
action between the two groups. Some educators believe that
smaller school populations lessen discipline problems
(Coeyman 1990).
The findings also showed a difference existed in
perceptions of principals and teachers in regard to the
level of teacher motivation exhibited by the teachers. The
teachers saw themselves as being highly motivated, more so
than the principals. Although school administrators agree
that motivation in an organization is crucial, they fail to
see teachers as motivated as the teachers see themselves.
Because it was the teacher whose motivation was addressed in
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this study, it positively verifies that teachers perceive
teachers to be highly motivated.
The findings of this study also revealed that no
difference in perceptions of the principals and teachers of
various school locations (metro and nonmetro) existed with
the quality of instruction. It should be noted, however,
that survey items dealing with direct student instruction
were rated more positively than other statements in this
area.
Georgia school principals and teachers generally
perceive that the Pay-for-Performance Program has had a
positive effect upon education of students, particularly in
the areas of parental involvement, student achievement, and
quality of instruction.
Implications
Based on the findings of this study, school size
makes a difference. The teachers and principals in the
smaller schools perceived the parental involvement to be
higher. Those schools give the parents and students alike a
sense of belonging (Coeyman 1990) . In addition, the
educators in the small schools believed the quality of
instruction to be greater than did the educators from the
large schools. Both the principals and teachers in the small
schools felt that teacher motivation was greater than did
those in the large schools, although the teachers in both
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the large and small schools felt teacher motivation to be
greater than the principals in both types of schools. The
school size had a greater impact on the tested constructs
than the school locations. In testing the variables there
were no significant findings on school location.
The Pay-for-Performance Program is a positive school
initiative for improving student achievement, parental
involvement, teacher motivation, and quality of instruction,
especially in combination with a small school size. School
districts that develop and implement incentive programs
should be provided with financial assistance. The Georgia
Pay-for-Performance Program shows a positive significance,
according to the principals' and teachers' perceptions. This
program and others similar to it should be highly encouraged
for implementation in all of Georgia's schools to bring
about school improvements in parental involvement, teacher
motivation, student achievement, and quality of instruction.
Based upon the findings of the fifth grade reading
scores, this researcher was curious as to why this particu¬
lar subject and grade level's mean score fell significantly
lower while participating in PfP. Further investigation
revealed that several occurrences took place with this
particular grade level during the 1996-97 school year.
Several of the DeKalb County schools orally reported an
influx of non-English-speaking students (immigrants and
refugees). Because these students could not speak the
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English language, they did not perform very well on this
portion of the ITBS test, although many of those students
did very well on the math, especially on the computation
portion of the ITBS. That fact probably lowered the fifth
grade reading scores. In addition, the Georgia Department of
Education changed the ITBS form that was administered to the
fifth graders during 1996-97 from Form K to Form M. The
previous Form K had been administered to the students for
several years. The administration of a different form test
at the same level may have had a casual impact upon the test
results. This minimal effect may continue for one or two
years, as the teachers adjust their instruction and become
more familiar with Form M.
Recommendations
Based upon the findings of this study, recommenda¬
tion for the continuation of the Pay-for-Performance Program
is highly suggested. This program has positive effects on
parental involvement, student achievement, quality of
instruction, and teacher motivation. One teacher respondent
reported, "I know that you're looking for 'numbers' but I
just want to tell you there was an energy in the air during
PfP--more teamwork among the entire school and more checks
and balances." The old cliche, "What is monitored gets
done," stands out at this point.
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Pay-for-Performance made significantly positive
differences in schools. Principals and school staffs should
embrace the program and write their school's PfP plan.
Participating schools have made school-wide improvements,
and it seems to bring about positive school-wide collabora¬
tion among the staff because everyone is working together
toward the same goals.
The findings of this study support continuation of
the PfP Program. The Georgia Department of Education should
continue funding the PfP Program, and school boards should
find funds to support additional incentive programs.
However, while Georgia state-level officials view PfP as a
school-wide improvement plan, the school-level educators
view it as a monetary incentive. The entire area of incen¬
tive and performance-based pay plans in education is the
subject of much controversy and diversities of opinion
(Duttweiler 1986, Johnson 1986) . Given the amount of money,
interest, and the findings of this study, a great deal more
research needs to be conducted on PfP and similar incentive
programs to guide professional, public, and legislative
opinion.
A longitudinal research study is recommended.
Studies on the relationship of size of school population and
student academic performance are suggested. The knowledge of
student success in a smaller school population versus the
level of student success in larger schools can be used in
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making educational decisions relative to school size. It is
recommended that further study be conducted on school size.
Summary
This chapter provides the specific findings and
recommendations based upon the findings of this study. These
recommendations are for use in the Georgia school systems.
The following recommendations focus on school size, student
achievement, parental involvement, quality of instruction,
and teacher motivation.
1. It is recommended that school systems find ways
to make schools smaller. If not the entire school, then the
school class size must be made smaller. Smaller schools have
greater teacher motivation and student achievement.
2. It is recommended that principals and school
staff participate in the Pay-for-Performance Program. This
program has a positive relationship on teacher motivation,
parental involvement, quality of instruction, and student
achievement.
3. It is recommended that state departments, school
boards, and principals find funds and/or creative ways to
offer teachers extrinsic rewards (monetary'rewards) for
excellent performance of job functions.
4. Finally, it is recommended that additional
research be done on Pay-for-Performance and similar
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incentive programs to guide professional, public, and
legislative opinion.
APPENDIX A
TEN-COUNTY METROPOLITAN ATLANTA AREA
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On Cherokee
Source: Map supplied by Atlanta Regional Commission, faxed
to author. (Only for purpose of identifying the counties;
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Fig. 1. Figural representation of the theoretical framework
APPENDIX C
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THE STUDY
Clark Atlanta University
Scplcniber 29, 1998
To Wliom II May Concern;
Please be advised that Ms. Mac 0. Allen has successfully defended her dissertation
proposal entitled “A Comparative Study ofPrincipals and Teachers Perception of the
Effects of the Pay-For-Pcrformance Incentive Program in Selected Georgia Schools" on
July 23, 1998. Site is now ready to conduct her data analysis and your assistance is
greatly needed and appreciated in helping her with this request.
If further infomiation is needed, please feel free to call me at (404) 880-8493.
Sincerely,









Subject: Approval for Dissertation
Dear Colleagues,
The Department of Research and Evaluation has approved the proposal of Mae
Allen, ILT of Avondale Elemenatry School for data collection.
She is doing her dissertation, and requires your support in collecting data. I
know its late in the year, but she is one of our own, and if you could help,
your asistant would be greatly appreciated.
If by chance, you cannot help, please let her know your extenuating
circumstances.









OeKalb County School System
AVONDALE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
10 Lakeshore Drive
Avondale Estates, Georgia 30002-1499
(404) 294-5324
September 27, 1998
Dr, John W. Rhodes
Office of the Director of School Renewal and Improvement Programs
1954 Twin Towers East
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
Dear Dr. Rhodes,
I am an employee ofDeKalb County School System and a graduate student at Clark Atlanta
University, pursuing an Educational Doctoral degree in Educational Leadership. As a part ofmy
degree requirements, I am to complete a research study, and have chosen student achievement as
one ofmy variables, due to my interest in that area.
Student achievement refers to the academic performance of students on a standardized tests, such
as the Iowa Test ofBasic Skills (ITBS). The areas of reading comprehension and math total for
selected schools in Georgia will be analyzed. The schools selected were based upon their success
in winning the Pay-for-Performance in 1996-97. The schools’ building grade level profiles in
grades 3, 5, and 8 will be compared against their 1994-95 and 1995-96 scores.
I would greatly appreciate you completing the attached form, and returning it to me by October 6.
The privacy of these schools will be maintained. In the study, the elementary schools will be
identified as schools A-Y, and the middle schools will be identified as schools 1-10. After the
research is completed, all identifying materials will be destroyed.




’THE SCHOOL CANNOT LIVEAPART FROM THE COMMUNITY’
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Georgia Department of Education





State Superintendent of Schools
(404) 6S7-7637 Fax (404) 651-9111
October 1,1998
Ms. Mae O. Allen
Avondale Elementary School
10 Lakeshore Drive
Avondale Estates, GA 30002-1499
Dear Ms. Allen;
Thank you for your letter dated September 29, 1998. The information you requested is not
available in my office. ITBS scores are available through the Department's Accountability Unit
and is accessible through the internet. I have spoken with Dr. Jerry McCoy and he indicated that
he would contact you and provide further assistance to you in accessing the information you
need through the internet.
Thank you for your interest in the Pay for Performance Program. Good luck on the completion
of your research study and your degree.
School Renewal and School Improvement Programs
(jr
cc: Dr. Jerry McCoy
APPENDIX D
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Think aboutyourschool before Payfor Performance was Insllluleti (in 1995-1996). Then use the scale on theUft to
respond to each Item.
Then think ofyour school whileyou were panicipating in the Payfor Performance program (in 1996-1997). Use the
scale on the right to again respond to each item.
There is no right or wrong answer; however, it is imponani thatyou respond to every item.
Before PfP (1995-1996) During PfP (1996-1997)
Affw Acfw OlMfrw ItliUTM
Sv«aciy Hit—ely
Afrw Agrar (Mmstw Ohurw
4 3 2 1 All staff understand their responsibility for basic skill
achievement.
4 3 2 I
4 3 2
4 3 2
2. Teachers teach the basic skill objectives identified 4 3 2
for their grade level to all their students.









4 The principal/assistant pruicipal is involved in
planning for instruction.
5 Teachers and the prutcipal analyze test results to
plan instructional program modifications
6 Student assessment information (such as criterion-
referenced tests, skills checklists, etc.) is taken into
consideration when planning for instruction.
7 The principal leads frequent formal discussions
concerning instruction and student achievement.







9. Very little instructional time is lost as a result of noise. 4 3 2
aimouncements. discipline and/or organizational activities.




11 Children with special needs are given special
consideration when planning for mstruction.






Before PfP (1995-1996) During PfP (1996-1997)
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14. Teachers feel responsible for students'performance. 4 3
t
15. Teachen help make adjustments in the school's curriculum. 4 3
16. Teachers adjust the pace of instruction to meet student needs. 4 3
17. Teachers engage students in diverse instructional 4 3
activities to enhance learning.
18. Teachers participate in staffdevelopment activities to 4 3
improve their instructional skills.
19 Each teacher is formally evaluated on his or her 4 3
performance annually.
20. Teachers are always seeking new information 4 3
to enhance the instructional program.
21 There is strong instructional leadership from the principal 4 3
22 There is a formative evaluation process in place. 4 3
23 Teachers modify their teaching styles to meet student 4 3
leamuig styles.
24 In faculty meetings, there is a feelmg of “let's 4 3
get things done'"











4 3 2 26Teachers talk about staymg here rather than transferring 4 3




27Teachers voluntarily work long hours to achieve objectives 4 3
28 Teachers in this school are concerned with performance 4 3 2
rather than “getting by" and picking up their checks.
29 Teachers encourage students to do their best. 4 3 2






















31. Teachers willingly give extra help to students to
help them succeed.
f
32. Teachers readily assist each other in attaining the
school goals.
33. Teachers in this school are seldom absent from work.
34. Many parents visit the school to attend special programs,
athletic events or meetmgs
35. Parents are involved in decision makmg activities which
affect the school.
36. Most parents participate in the school PTA.
37. Most parents seek out information about their child's
educational progress.
38 Most parents teach their children appropriate behavior
and discipline for school
39 Parents care about their child's school performance.
40. Parents help to shape the school's vision.
41 Parents have a role in evaluating the effectiveness of
the school programs.
42 Many parents help with fundraising for school.
43 Many parents attend parent conferences.
44 Most parents participate in parentmg workshops or
inservices
45 Many parents volunteer at the school.
Asm Acr«» Piny pnnrw
4 3 2
Please turn the page®^
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Demographic Information1.What crade levd(s) did you teach during the 1995-1996 school year?2.What grade level(s) did you teach during the 1996-1997 school year?3.What is your school population (size)?4.What position do you hold?
Administrator (principal, assistant principal, part-time teacher/part-time
administrative assistant, instructional lead teacher or curriculum specialist)
Teacher (classroom, special education, music, art, PE, etc.)
Thank you for your responses.
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DeKalb County School System
AVONDALE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
10 Lakeshore Drive
Avondale Estates, Georgia 30002-1499
(404) 294-5324
Dear Fellow Educator:
You are a faculty member of a school that won a Pay for Performance award in 1996-1997.
Congratulations!
As a member of this group of teachers, you have informatioh that will be helpful in a study I am
conducting. I am interested in your perceptions of teacher motivation, parental involvement and
quality of instructions in your school before and during 1996-1997. Your response is important to
the success of this study because of the small number of faculties that won this award in 1997.
Included is an envelope for you to seal the completed questionnaire in and return to your
principal All of the sealed envelopes from you and your colleagues will be forwarded to me in
one package. Information from the questionnaires will not be identified by school or respondent
Your anonymity is assured through this method











DeKalb County School System
AVONDALE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
10 Lak^shore Drive
Avondale Estates, Georgia 30002-1499
(404) 294-5324
Dear Principal:
The subject of student achievement in our schools need urgent attention. Your school was a
winner in the Pay for Performance Program in 1997. As a result, you and your staff are in a
unique position to help me with a study about the effectiveness ofPay for Performance on student
achievement.
I would appreciate your assistance in the distribution and collection of a questionnaire in which
staff give their perceptions about teacher motivation, parental involvement and quality of
instructions in your school before and during 1996-1997. Please survey one-half ofyour teaching
staff, particularly the teachers who were at the school during the 95-96 and 96-97 school years.
In addition, please complete a survey for yourself or another administrator at your school may do
so Your cooperation is important to the success of this study because of the small number of
faculties that won this award in 1997.
If possible, would you distribute and collect the questionnaires during a faculty meeting'’
Individual envelopes have been provided for staffmembers to seal their responses and return to a
central location. I have provided a postage paid return envelope for you to use in returning them
to me







I sent an important questionnaire to you a few weeks ago asking about your Pay-for-Performance
experience. Ifyou and your staff have not yet completed and returned this questionnaire, will you
please take time to do it today? Your reply is important to educational research and will help in
the designing of new programs and teaching strategies to improve student achievement.




PAY FOR PERFORMANCE AWARD RECIPIENTS BY YEAR
School Code iSvstem Total 1994 Totalises 'Total 1996 iTotal 1997
Capitol View Elem :76M564 Atlama
^ i 1 $64,000
Harper-Archer HS 761-t564 Atlanta ! $148,000
Miles Elem 761-4564 Atlanta $52,000
—
Mitchell Elem 761-5564 Atlanta $62,000
E. Riveis Elem 761-5564 Atlanta $92,000
South Atlanta HS 761-0195 Atlanta $180,000
—
Sutton Middle 761-3067 Atlanta
■
$124,000 $128,000
Sylvan Middle i 761-3067 Atlanta $138,000
Tbomasville Heights El '761-3067 Atlanta $98,000
West Fulton MS 761-0293 Atlanta i $126,000 $132,000 $134,000
Woodson Elem 761-0293 Atlanta 1 $78,000
Noithside Elem 605-5052 Baldwin 1 $68,000
Banks County Piimary 606-1089 Banks $62,000
County Line Elem 607-3050 Barrow i $70,000
Mission Road Elem 608-0186 Bartow | ! j $102,000
Appling MS 611-5050 Bibb I $92,000
Bleckley County MS 612-0277 Bleckley $86,000
Buford Elem 764-01% Buford i $110,000
Jackson Primaiy 618-0194 Butts i $104,000
Caneisville Primary 767-0177 Cartersville $130,000
Alps Road Elem 629-5054 Clarke $74,000 $78,000
Baker Elem 633-0189 Cobb $128,000
Clarkdale Elem 633-2054 Cobb $78,000
Davis Elem 633-0388 Cobb $102,000 1 $104,000
Ford Elem 633-0292 Cobb $168,000
Griffin MS 633-2560 Cobb $150,000
Kincaid Elem 633-0273 Cobb $112,000
LaBelle Bern 633-3062 Cobb $102,000
Mabry MS 633-0178 Cobb $146,000
Sedalia Park Elem 633-5067 Cobb $80,000 $86,000
Shallowford Falls Bern 633-0291 Cobb $94,000 !
SimpsonMS 633-0389 ICobb ! $126,000 i
Sptayberry HS 633-0373 iCobb $244,000
Tritt Elem 633-0181 !Cobb $116,000
Columbia MS 636-2050 Columbia I t $106,000
N. Columbia Elem 636-3052 ‘Columbia $60,000 $62,000
Johnson Elem 643-3052 Decatur i $68,000
Avondale Elem 644-5050 DeKalb 1 $130,000
i '
Hooper Alexander Ben* 644-1050 DeKalb ■ 1 $114,000 i
McNair Junior High 644-1057 iDeKalb i ■ $150,000
1




School Code Svstem Total 1994 Total 1995 Total 1996 Total 1997
Murphey Candler Elem 644-W52 'DeKalb 1 ! i $72,000
Pine Ri(^e Eletn 644-0190 iDekalb : 1 ‘ $104,000 $124,000
Rainbow Elem 644-(064 iDeKalb ! I 1 $100,000
Sexton Woods Center 644-6377 iDeKalb 1 1 ! $68,000
Terry Mill Elem 644-5068 iDeKalb !- i ! $104,000
Tilson Elem 644-2069 iDeKalb r i ^ '1 i 1 $90,000
Woodndge Elem 644-0675 iOcKalb i ! ' $100,000
Woodward Elem 644-1071 IDeKalb 1 1 1 $108,000
Douglas County HS .648-4050 1Douglas ! 1 1 $214,000
Adrian Elem 653-1050 iEmanuel ! 1 1 $28,000
Fayetteville Elem 656-4050 !Fayette i ! 1 $80,000
Pepperell MS 657-0273 inoyd i i • $114,000
Mashbum Elem 658-0176 i Forsyth : ! 1 $68,000
Midway Elem 658-1052 iForsyth I 1 1' ! i $104,000
Camp Creek MS 660-0186 iFulton ! i ' $168,000
Chattahoochee HS 660-0392 Fulton ! 1 $374,000
Ciabappie Crossing El 660-0193 iFulton i ! : $144,000
Dolvin Elem 660-0180 IFulton ' $166,000
Haynes Bridge MS 660-0384 Fulton i 1 $230,000
Independence HS 660-0386 Fulton ; i ; $64,000
Milton HS 660-2060 Fulton ' : ^ $310,000
Roswell HS 660-0191 Fulton
'
$268,000
Sandy Springs MS 660-0492 1Fulton ! 1 $132,000
Tri-Cities HS 660-0691 Fulton : i ; $288,000
Arcado Elem 667-0382 ! Gwinnett
' 1 ' $114,000
Jackson Elem 667-0395 1Gwinnett . i $190,000
Lilbum Elem 667-5554 •Gwiimett i • ! $154,000
Peachtree Elem 667-5056 iGwinnett . : = $168,000
Ptnckneyville MS 667-0186 :Gwinnett j $142,000
Fauview Elem 668-5050 1Habersham 1 i $40,000
West Hall MS 669-0294 Hall ■ $154,000
North Jackson Elem 678-3050 i Jackson : ‘ ; $44,000
Lee County Primary 688-0187 iLee ; $108,000
Lowndes Couiay HS 692-5050 'Lowndes • i i $264,000
Morgan Co. Elem. 704-0191 ! Morgan ! ! $88,000
Morgan Co. Middle 704-5050 Morgan 1 $106,000
Arnold MS 706-2050 Muscogee ' ! i $110,000
Eastway Elem 706-4058 Muscogee 1 $86,000
Edgewood Elem 706-1060 Muscogee $58,000 1 $58,000 ! $60,000 $64,000
Kendrick HS 706-1064 Muscogee i 1 $172,000
Livingston Elem 707-3050 Newton ! $90,000
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School Code System Total 1994 iTotal 1995 Total 1996 iTotal 1997




Rabun Gap School > 719-3530 Rabun 1 1 $42,000
Glenn Hills HS 721-3054 Richmond 1 1 $146,000
Salem HS 722-0192 Rockdale 1 $168,000
East Central Elem 783-0275 Rome $66,000 $74,000 !
Elm Soeet Elem 785-1052 Rome ; $56,000 $54,000 $56,000 1 $60,000
Rome MS 783-0293 Rome' SI 14.000 $112,000 $112,000 $108,000
Social Circle Elem 786-1050 Social Circle $76,000
Stewart County Elem 728-0192 Stewart $38,000
Chattanooga Vally Elea 746-4050 Walker i $90,000
Odum Elem 751-3050 Wayne 1 •j $48,000
Westside MS 755-0775 Whitfield j ! $80,000
Cofautta Elem 753-2050 Whitfield 1 1 $48,000
$1.048.000i $1,782,000 $3,096,000 I $6,694,000
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexander, L. 1986. Time for results: An overview. Phi Delta
Kappan 68: 202-204.
Atlanta Regional Commission. 1998. Map of ten-county metro¬
politan area. Atlanta, GA: Atlanta Regional Commission.
(Map faxed to author by ARC.)
Ballou, D., and M. Podgursky. 1997. Teacher pay and teacher
quality. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Berkey, Timothy B. 1996. Making big schools smaller. Educa¬
tion Digest 62: 10-15.
Boyer, E. L. 1985. High school: A report on secondary educa¬
tion in America. New York: Harper Collins.
Bushweller, K. 1997. Show us the money. The School Adminis¬
trator 184 (June): 16-21.
Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy, Task Force on
Teaching as a Profession. 1986. A nation prepared:
Teachers for the 21st century. New York: Carnegie Forum
on Education and the Economy.
Caldas, S. J., and C. Bankston, III. 1997. Effects of school
population socioeconomic status on individual academic
achievement. Journal of Educational Research (May/
June): 269-277.
Clardy, A. 1988. Compensation systems and school effective¬
ness: Merit pay as an incentive for school improvement.
Washington, DC: Educational Resources Information
Center.
Conley, S., and A. Odden. 1994. Linking teacher compensation
to teacher career development: A strategic examination.
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis: 8-9.
Coeyman, Majorie. 1998. In 90s schools, a return to small is




Comer, James P. 1988. Parent participation in the schools:
How do we improve programs for parent involvement?
Horizons 66: 58-59.
Comer, James P., and N. M. Haynes. 1991. Parent involvement
in schools: An ecological approach. Elementary School
Journal 91: 271-277.
Cornett, L. M. 1994. Ups and downs of incentive programs.
Southern Regional Education Board Career Ladder
Clearinghouse (April): 2.
Cornett, L. M., and G. F. Gaines. 1994. Reflecting on ten
years of incentive programs. Southern Regional Educa¬
tion Board Career Ladder Clearinghouse: 3.
Cresap, McCormick, and Paget, Inc. 1984. Teacher incentives:
A tool for effective management. Reston, VA: National
Association of Secondary School Principals, National
Association of Elementary School Principals, and
American Association of School Administrators.
Cross, P. K. 1987. The adventures of education in wonder¬
land: Implementing education reform. Phi Delta Kappan
68: 496-502.
Duttweiler, P. C. 1988. Improving teacher effectiveness:
Incentive programs, evaluation, and professional
growth. Education 109: 184-190.
Edmonds, Ronald R. 1982. Programs of school improvement:
An overview. Educational Leadership 40: 4-11.
Edmonds, Ronald R. 1986. Characteristics of effective
schools. In The school achievement of minority
children, ed. U. Neiser, 89-111. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Education Commission of the States, Task Force on Education
for economic growth. 1983. Washington, DC: Education
Commission of the States.
Educational Research Service. 1978. Methods of scheduling
salaries for teachers. Arlington, VA: Educational
Research Service.
Educational Research Service. 1983. Merit pay plans for
teachers: Status and descriptions. Arlington, VA:
Educational Research Service.
143
Excellence in Education Task Force. 1984. First in the
nation in education: Final report. Des Moines, lA:
State of Iowa.
English, F. 1992. History and critical issues of educational
compensation systems. In Teacher compensation and
motivation, ed. L. Fraze, 5-7. Lancaster, PA:
Technomic.
Farnsworth, B., J. Debenham, and G. Smith. 1991. Designing
and implementing a successful merit pay program for
teachers. Phi Delta Kappan 73: 320-325.
Ferris, J., and D. Winkler. 1986. Teacher compensation and
the supply of teachers. Elementary School Journal 86:
400.
Finn, C. E. 1990. The biggest reform of all. Phi Delta
Kappan 71: 587.
Fulton, M. 1996. The ABCs of investing in student perfor¬
mance . Denver, CO: Education Commission of the States,
November.
Gall, M. D., W. R. Borg, and J. P. Gall. 1996. Educational
research. White Plains, NY: Longman Publishers.
Georgia Association of Educators. 1991. Letter: Governor's
Task Force on Teacher Pay for Performance, 1-2.
Georgia Department of Education. 1993. Georgia Teacher
Evaluation Program: Evaluation manual. Atlanta: Georgia
Department of Education, July.
Georgia Department of Education. 1995. Pay for Performance
Program guidelines. Atlanta: Georgia Department of
Education, October.
Georgia Department of Education. 1996. 1995-96 report card.
Atlanta: Georgia Department of Education. Available on
internet: http://www.doe.K12.ga.US.
Georgia Department of Education. 1997. 1996-97 report card.
Atlanta: Georgia Department of Education. Available on
internet: http://www.doe.K12.ga.US.
Georgia Department of Education. 1997. Guidelines for the
Pay for Performance Program. Atlanta: Georgia
Department of Education, November.
144
Georgia Department of Education. 1998. 1998 public educa¬
tion directory. Atlanta: Georgia Department of Educa¬
tion.
Georgia Department of Education, Office of the State Super¬
intendent of Schools. 1996. Message to the public: Pay
for Performance. Atlanta: Georgia Department of Educa¬
tion, November, 1-2.
Georgia School Laws. 1992 edition. 1992. Charlottesville,
VA: The Michie Company.
Griffith, J. 1996. Relation of parental involvement,
empowerment, and school traits to student academic
performance. Journal of Educational Research 90: 33-41.
Gursky, D. 1992. Virginia district suspends heralded merit-
pay system. Education Week. 26 February 26.
Hatry, H. P., J. M. Greiner, and B. G. Ashford. 1994. Issues
and case studies in teacher incentive plans. 2d ed.
Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
Hawes, L., and G. Hawes. 1982. Concise dictionary of educa¬
tion. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company.
Herzberg, Frederick. 1987. One more time: How do you moti¬
vate employees? Harvard Business Review 65: 109-120.
Johns, G. 1983. Organizational behavior: Understanding life
at work. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.
Katz, M. B. 1987. Reconstructing American education. Cam¬
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Lipsky D. B., and S. B. Bacharach. 1983. The single salary
schedule vs. merit pay: An examination of the debate.
Collective Bargaining Quarterly 11: 2-5.
Loozen, L. V. 1983. Some points to consider when you discuss
merit pay. Arlington, VA: American Association of
School Administrators.
Lunenburg, F. C., and A. C. Ornstein. 1991. Educational
administration: Concepts and practices. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.
Medland, K. M. 1977. Title I parent involvement evaluation
(Report No. 77-19). Seattle, WA: Seattle Public
Schools, Washington Department of Management Infor¬
mation Services.
145
Miner, J, B. 1988. Organizational behavior: Performance and
productivity. New York: Random House.
Odden, A., and B. J. Allan. 1995. Incentives. School Organ¬
ization and Teacher Compensation. Washington, DC:
Office of Educational Research and Improvement.
Maslow, Abraham H. 1970. Motivation and personality, rev.
ed. New York: Harper and Row.
Murnane, R. J., and D. K. Cohen. 1986. Merit Pay and the
evaluation problem: Why most merit pay plans fail and a
few survive. Harvard Educational Review 56: 1-11.
Nathan, J. 1986. Implications for educators of time for
results. Phi Delta Kappan 68: 197-201, 252-253.
National Commission on Excellence in Education. 1983. A
nation at risk: The imperative for educational reform.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education.
National Commission on Excellence in Education. 1984. A
nation at risk: The full account. Cambridge, MA: USA
Research.
National Education Goals Panel. 1991. Report of the National
Education Goals Panel: Building a nation of learners.
Washington, DC: National Education Goals Panel.
Richardson, J. 1994. Va. district to give bonuses to top-
rated teachers. Education Week. May 25.
Reynolds, A. J. 1992. Comparing measures of parental
involvement and their effects on academic achievement.
Early Childhood Research Quarterly 7: 441-462.
Reynolds, A. J., R. P. Weissberg, and W. J. Kasprow. 1992.
Prediction of early social and academic adjustment of
children from the inner city. American Journal of
Community Psychology 20: 599-624.
Sharpes, D. K. 1987. Incentive pay and the promotion of
teaching proficiencies. The Clearing House 60: 406.
Stevenson, D. L., and D. P. Baker. 1987. The family-school
relation and the child's school performance. Child
Development 58: 1348-1357.
Suggs, E. 1998. Applying "3 Rs" to teachers. The Atlanta
Constitution. 8 July 1998: A-1, A-12.
Tuckman, Bruce W. 1994. Conducting educational research.
Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
146
Tyack, D. B., and M. H. Strober. 1981. Women and men in the
schools: A history of the sexual structuring of educa¬
tional employment. Washington, DC: National Institute
of Education.
U.S. Department of Education. 1998. ED initiatives: A
biweekly look at progress on the Secretary's priorities
(February 6): 1-5.
USA Today Magazine. 1992. What parents want for their kids.
Society for the Advancement of Education 120 (April):
5.
Weber, L. 1988. An instrument for assessing attitudes about
merit pay. Educational Research Quarterly 12: 5.
